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Abstract 
In this study I have analysed 18 Norwegian mutual equity funds during the period 1997-2013. 
All of the mutual funds are registered at the Oslo Stock Exchange as of December 2013. The 
purpose of the study was to analyse the performance of these funds, and find whether or not 
the funds were able to outperform their benchmark, both for the whole period and for shorter 
periods during the 17-year sample period. By dividing the whole period into shorter periods I 
have evaluated the mutual funds during periods of bull and bear markets. I wanted to see if 
there exists a connection between different stock market cycles and mutual funds excess 
return.  
 
Using linear regression and calculation of three well-known performance measures, the 
Sharpe ratio, the M2 measure and the information ratio, I have evaluated the mutual funds 
performance through the research period. Both the linear regression and the performance 
measures evaluate the mutual funds against a benchmark index, and in my research I have 
data from the Oslo Stock Exchange Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX).  
 
Based on the regression analysis and the performance measures I have ranked the mutual 
funds. When not taking any risk measures into account, an equally-weighted portfolio of all 
my mutual funds had lower total return than OSEFX. However, individually 50% of the funds 
showed higher total return than OSEFX. When adjusting for risk, using performance 
measures, there were both mutual funds outperforming and underperforming OSEFX. 
However, in the calculations of both risk-adjusted and clean return-based measurements the 
highest ranked mutual funds based on one measure seemed to repeat and rank high in other 
measurements as well. When analysing the shorter periods, the results were not as consistent. 
Outperforming OSEFX in periods of upswing did not necessarily imply outperformance of 
OSEFX in periods of recession and vice versa.  
 
From the regression analysis I cannot conclude that the funds have significant alpha values, 
and therefore no significant risk-adjusted excess return. However, based on the performance 
measures and excess return some of the funds did beat their benchmark.  
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1 Introduction 
1.2 Motivation 
In the field of investments, the never-ending discussion for investors is whether to buy active 
or passive managed securities. Ever since the first Norwegian mutual funds were established, 
the question of whether the portfolio managers outperform their benchmark index or not have 
been asked. Are the stock pickers (active portfolio managers) deserving the management fees 
and producing higher returns than the significantly cheaper passive managers?  
 
In this thesis I have chosen a sample of Norwegian mutual funds with low minimum 
investments. The purpose of this is to evaluate the mutual funds that are available and 
investable for ordinary people. Even though historical returns and performance is no 
guarantee for future performance, it might be a useful guide when deciding where to invest.  
 
This is why I wanted to do my research on this subject; both for scientific reason but also as a 
practical guide to private investors. I simply want to learn more about investments in mutual 
funds, compare active managed funds with their benchmarks, and try to figure out if it is 
worthwhile to pay for stock picking.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
I have chosen to focus on the period 1997-2013. In this period I want to analyse and evaluate 
the performance of my chosen sample of Norwegian mutual funds.  
 
The evaluation is based on regression analyses and performance measures. The mutual funds 
are compared to a benchmark with the purpose of finding excess return of the funds relative to 
the benchmark. The goal is to find whether it is active or passive management that yields the 
highest returns and if the funds are able to outperform their benchmark. Based on the 
estimates from the regression analyses and the calculations of the performance measures, I 
will rank the funds and find which fund would have been the optimal investment choice in 
1997.  
 
In addition, I want to analyse the performance of my sample of mutual funds during different 
cycles in the stock market during my period of research. I will look at how the mutual funds 
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perform during bull and bear markets, and whether they manage do generate excess return in 
both kinds of business cycles. How do they perform compared to their benchmark index? 	  
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 gives a description of the mutual fund market, 
the importance of indices and an investor’s decision of passive or active management. In 
chapter 3 I give a presentation of bull and bear markets, and define the periods of bull and 
bear I use in my study. Chapter 4 is a theoretical chapter describing the theories underlying 
the practical research. I also present the different performance measures used to compare the 
funds against each other and to their benchmark. In chapter 5 I describe the data I have used 
including justifications of the funds I chose to do the research on, and the choice of a relevant 
benchmark. The chapter also includes all my empirical results, both for the whole period and 
for the periods of bull and bear market. In the end of chapter 5 I rank the funds based on the 
previous results, trying to determine which fund had the best performance. Finally, I sum up 
and conclude from the results I have found during the study in chapter 6. 
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2 Funds and Indices 
2.1 Norwegian Mutual Funds 
A mutual fund is a business that receives capital from investors and savers, and then invests 
the capital into different kinds of securities. The Act on securities funds regulates this type of 
business in Norway. The Act on securities funds (2011) §1-2 defines a mutual fund as:   
“Securities fund: ︎ an independent body of assets essentially comprising securities deriving 
from deposits of capital from an indefinite range of participants.” 
There has been a sharp growth in the number of Norwegian mutual funds over the last 
decades. The first Norwegian mutual fund was established in 1981 (Nordea, 2015a), and ever 
since, we have seen an increasing interest for mutual funds, from both institutional investors 
and private savers. In my research I will not go all the way back to 1981, but look at the 
period 1997-2013. The reason for choosing this period is both due to availability of data, a 
sufficient number of funds with long enough performance history, and also the fact that the 
period is long enough to observe fund performance both through upswings and downswings 
in the stock market.  
 
There are several types of mutual funds traded at the Oslo Stock Exchange (Hegnar.no), and 
their risk and return profile are shown in figure 1: 
i) Equity mutual funds  
ii) Money market funds 
iii) Bond funds 
iv) Balanced funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected risk 
	  
Expected return 
Money	  market	  funds	  Bonds	  
Balanced	  funds	  Equity	  funds	  
Stocks	  
Figure	  1	  Risk	  and	  return	  profiles	  for	  securities 
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2.1.1 Mutual Equity Funds 
In my study, I will discuss only mutual equity funds, more specifically Norwegian equity 
funds. Equity funds are the most common fund product in the universe of mutual funds. These 
are funds where 80-100% of the capital is invested in the stock market. An equity fund must 
consist of a minimum of 16 different stocks (Morningstar, 2003), but in practice we see that 
the portfolios consists of a larger number of stocks. In the long run one can expect higher 
returns through savings in an equity fund than saving in a balanced fund or a money market 
fund. Meanwhile, as the risk is higher, one must be prepared to experience higher volatility. 
However, by a long investment horizon, there are strong scientific evidence that prices 
increase more than they decrease (a. n. Verdipapirfondenes Forening).  
 
Mutual equity funds are divided into different subgroups related to geographical areas and 
different sectors of the market. The subgroups are classified by different criteria, and these are 
the most important criteria (Verdipapirfondenes Forening, 2012a):  
i)  There must be at least five funds within the same category for a group to be 
established.  
ii) For a fund to be classified within a group it must have at least 80% of the funds 
assets exposed within the investment universe the group belongs to. 
iii) For geographically classified groups the investment universe is restricted to only 
equity instruments listed on the stock exchange in that particular geographical 
area.  
 
An investment universe can be geographically restricted, such as a Norwegian equity fund or 
a European equity fund, sector restricted or a combination of these.  
 
2.1.2 Money Market Funds 
A money market fund places the investors capital in money market instruments and 
certificates, to achieve higher return than by traditional bank deposits. Such funds invest in 
short-term securities and fixed income instruments, and they cannot invest in fixed income 
securities where the maturity exceeds one year. There are three different types of money 
market funds; money market funds with low risk, money market funds and international 
money market funds. The criteria to be placed in a certain classification of money market 
funds consists mainly of the funds interest rate sensitivity and the funds weighted average 
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maturity (Verdipapirfondenes Forening, 2012b). A funds interest rate sensitivity describes 
how the funds price change when there is a percentage change in the funds investments. The 
lower interest rate sensitivity, the lower risk the fund faces. The funds weighted average 
maturity is defined as the weighted average time until the cash flow of the loans included in 
the funds portfolio is repaid. In a low risk money market fund the weighted average maturity 
must be less than one year, and in a money market fund the weighted average maturity must 
be less than one and a half year.  
 
2.1.3 Bond Funds 
A bond fund invests the capital in bonds. As with a money market fund a bond fund invest in 
fixed income securities, but without the duration requirements. Bond funds have higher risk 
related to changes in the interest rates than money market funds (a. n. Verdipapirfondenes 
Forening). Due to the higher risk, one can also expect higher returns than you can expect with 
a money market fund. The longer maturity the fixed income securities have, the higher 
expected risk. Bond funds are divided into subgroups reflecting how long the maturity of the 
fixed income securities are, which reflects the funds interest rate sensitivity relative to the 
benchmark index.  
 
There are also other kinds of fixed income funds that invest in different kinds of securities 
with higher risk related to credit risk. This category is often called “high yield” bonds or 
“junk” bonds.  
 
2.1.4 Balanced Funds 
A balanced fund is a fund combining investments in the stock market and in the money 
market. The allocation between stocks and interest rates in a balanced fund varies between 
funds, but it can also vary inside the fund. The risk in a balanced fund will depend on the 
allocation between bonds, interest rates and stocks. The larger share of stocks in the fund, the 
higher risk and higher expected return. Similar to an equity fund, balanced funds are classified 
according to the investment universe the fund will invest within. There are three main 
subgroups of balanced funds (a. n. Verdipapirfondenes Forening):  
1. Norwegian balanced funds where the fund must consist of at least 80% Norwegian 
securities.  
2. International balanced funds that have an international mandate.  
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3. Life cycle funds; a classification indicating that in the start of the funds life, the 
proportion of stocks in the fund are high, while later in the life cycle the fund 
increases the proportion of bonds and fixed income securities. The reason is to reduce 
the risk, as investors want to redeem their shares of the fund.  
 
2.2 Indices 
A stock market index is the measurement of a selection of stocks representing certain 
geographies, sectors or categories of listed companies. The goal of an index is to as accurate 
as possible reflect the risk and return profile of a specific investment universe without 
necessarily containing all stocks in that specific universe in the index (FTSE, 2015). This is 
why we call an index a representative for a certain market. The purpose of an index is both to 
provide a representative picture of the movements in average market values, and also to be 
used as a benchmark for investors to measure their performance against. Active managers 
seek to outperform their benchmark index, whereas at the same time pay attention to the risk 
their portfolio faces versus the index´ risk. The most known indices today are MSCI World 
Index, The Dow Jones Index, the S&P 500 and Nikkei 225. Over the years, several new 
indices have been established along with the development of new markets, technologies and 
sectors.  
 
It would be both expensive and time consuming for a single investor to invest in all stocks 
existing in a market or an industry. This is why indices are also practical for investment 
purposes. In the market place you can find different products (funds, ETF´s, futures, options), 
which replicate indices making it both convenient and cheap for investors to be able to 
efficiently get market exposure and follow the trends in selected markets.   
 
By 20.03.2015 there existed 72 different indices at Oslo Stock Exchange which each 
represent a different investment universe (Oslo Børs, 2015a). The Norwegian indices are 
divided into three groups; indices containing stock listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange, indices 
containing stocks listed in Oslo Axess and indices containing stocks listed on both the Oslo 
Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess. Stocks listed in the Oslo Stock Exchange are typically large 
companies with a long history and a large shareholder base. In Oslo Axess smaller companies 
can get listed at an authorized and regulated market place and achieve the benefits this 
provides, such as liquidity and financing. As a curiosity, the Oslo Stock Exchange is 
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launching a new index these days. The index will consist of medium sized companies and is 
called Oslo Stock Exchange Mid Cap Index (OSEMX). The launch date is June 1 2015.  
 
There are many indices at the Oslo Stock Exchange, and I will now present the most 
important ones. The information is retrieved from the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs, 
2015b):  
- Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) is an index holding a representative 
sample of all stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange. The purpose of this index is to 
represent the overall movements at the Oslo Stock Exchange. The value growth of this 
index is an appropriate representative to show the overall growth in the Norwegian 
equity market. From 1997 to 2013 OSEBX increased its value by 243%. In chapter 
5.8.1 I will see how this compares to the funds and to the funds benchmark index.  
- The Oslo Stock Exchange OBX Index (OBX) consists of the 25 most traded stocks at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. The most traded stocks are based on six months turnover 
rating. The index is tradable and offers both futures and options.  
- The Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index (OSEAX) includes all shares listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. 
- The Oslo Stock Exchange Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) is a weight-adjusted version 
of OSEBX. The weight adjustments happen according to the UCITS requirements for 
mutual fund investments. One security cannot hold more than 10% of total market 
value in the index, and securities holding more than 5% of the market value cannot 
exceed a total of 40% of the index´ total value.  
 
2.3 Active or Passive Management?  
At the Oslo Stock Exchange there exists both mutual funds that are actively and passively 
managed. A common strategy for passive management is to invest in an index fund, and these 
mutual funds seek to match the performance of a specific index. An example of an index fund 
is the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and this fund replicates the composition of the Standard & 
Poor´s 500 stock price index (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011). An index fund buys shares 
included in the market index in proportion to each security´s representation in the index. By 
investing in an index fund you achieve a low-cost passive investment strategy, without 
engaging in security analysis.  
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When a manager has an active management strategy he seeks to outperform the broad market 
represented by an index. The managers try to do this by predicting the future market 
movements and then pick the right stocks and the right proportion of the individual stocks for 
the mutual fund to hold. For the mutual fund to be able to create excess return relative to its 
benchmark index you either need a good portion of luck, information about the market that 
the other market participants does not have or an exceptional ability to pick the right stocks at 
the right time (Sørensen, 2009).  I will revisit Lars Qvigstad Sørensens research results in 
chapter 5.7 
 
Active managed mutual funds are more expensive to buy than index funds because of the 
management fees. Therefore, the managers have to deliver return for the mutual funds that 
both exceed the index return and the management fees. The average management fee in my 
sample of Norwegian mutual funds is 1,49%. This means that on average in my sample, the 
active managed mutual funds have to outperform the benchmark index by more than 1,49% to 
create excess returns.  
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3 Bull and Bear Markets in the Norwegian Stock Market 
3.1 Bullish and Bearish Markets 
In my research I want to find whether active managed mutual funds did or did not outperform 
the index during upswings and downswings in the Norwegian stock market. Do active 
managed mutual funds outperform the index in bullish markets or bearish markets?  
 
Both in individual mutual funds and in different markets there are large variations in the price. 
These movements may vary from day to day, but there also exists trends in the market, in 
specific sectors or in geographic areas. Trends usually last for a longer period of time and 
may affect the whole market. Financial crises or strong growth in a country´s economy can 
lead to a bullish or bearish stock market. A stock market in an upward trend is called a 
“bull/bullish market”, and when the market is declining over a longer period of time we say 
that we have a “bear/bearish market” (Oslo Børs, 2007).  A bearish market represents 
pessimism and decreasing values in securities, and a bullish market represents optimism and 
increasing values.  
 
3.2 Bull and Bear Markets in Norway Between 1997-2013 
The market movements in Norway in the 17-year period between 1997-2013 have been 
influenced by both international and national circumstances. To spot the upward and 
downward trends in the stock market we have to look at indices representing the whole 
Norwegian market. As mentioned in chapter 2.2 OSEFX is a weight-adjusted version of 
OSEBX, and it is therefore suitable to discover movements in the market.  
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Figure 2 shows the development of OSEFX from 1997 to 2014. This index is the benchmark 
index to all the active managed mutual funds I use in my research except one, and the index 
movements would therefore both reflect the overall movements in the Norwegian stock 
market and in the mutual fund market.  
 
During the 17-year sample period the Norwegian stock market has experienced both bullish 
and bearish markets. These periods affect how investors behave, and the movements in the 
Norwegian stock market are affected by both national and international macroeconomic 
influences. Throughout the 17-year sample period, the movements in the Norwegian stock 
market may have been affected by the “dot.com bubble” (Madslien, 2010), strictly increasing 
housing prices in both the Norwegian housing market and on an international level (Larsen & 
Mjølhus, 2009), and the financial crisis affecting markets globally. Further on in my research 
I want to see how these macroeconomic factors affect the Norwegian stock market, and 
whether active portfolio managers are able to outperform their benchmark index in bullish 
and bearish markets. The periods I want to examine are:  
- The bear market from 2000 to 2003 when the “dot.com bubble” burst.  
- The bull market from 2003 to 2007 represented by increased housing prices and low 
interest rates.  
- The bear market from 2007 to 2009 when the financial crisis was a fact.  
- The bull market from 2009 to 2013 with global growth and financial recovery.  
0	  100	  
200	  300	  
400	  500	  
600	  700	  
OSEFX	  1997-­‐2014	  
Figure	  2	  Net	  asset	  values	  for	  Oslo	  Stock	  Exchange	  Mutual	  Fund	  Index 
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4. Theory 
4.1 Modern Portfolio Theory  
The modern portfolio theory was introduced by Harry Markowitz (1952) and is a theory 
describing how investors can construct portfolios to either optimize or maximize their 
expected return given a level of risk (Markowitz, 1952). The modern portfolio theory shows 
how to select a portfolio, done in two stages. In the first stage the investor observe, experience 
and form believes about securities future performance. The second stage is when the investor 
uses his believes about future performance to choose a portfolio. When choosing a portfolio, 
the theory of diversification is inevitable. 
 
When you invest in a mutual fund you diversify your portfolio. The risk is spread over several 
single stocks, and this will decrease your unsystematic risk. Your sensitivity to a price drop in 
one single stock is decreasing when you invest in several other stocks. The theory of 
diversification is represented by mean-variance frontiers. The mean-variance frontier shows 
the best set of portfolios that you as an investor can have with respect to risk and return (Ang, 
2014). Though, this frontier only considers means and volatility. The mean-variance frontier 
shows how to balance your portfolio with two assets to optimize it with respect to volatility 
and expected return. The optimal diversification strategy, the weights to each of the assets, is 
called the minimum variance portfolio.  
 
Often you will see by holding two assets in your portfolio instead of only one will give you 
what is called diversification benefits. Owning an amount of both assets will protect you from 
a disaster if one of the assets is lost. This diversification benefits imply that we should not 
only consider assets alone and isolated (Markowitz, 1952). We need to know how assets 
behave together. Mutual funds are exploiting this advantage of diversification, not only by 
dividing between two assets, but also by investing in 20-50 different assets. The main goal of 
the managers of these funds is to maximize the returns and minimize the risk. By investing in 
assets where the returns are not perfectly correlated, you decrease the risk. Lets say that an oil 
company and a renewable energy company do not have perfect correlation. If the oil company 
performs well, the renewable energy company may perform badly and vice versa. Since you 
have invested in both assets, you will probably never loose your whole investment, because 
when one of the stocks fall, the other will either not fall as much or possibly increase in value. 
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If one of the stocks increases in value when the other stock falls, we say that the stocks are 
negatively correlated.   
 
The diversification benefits are measured by covariance or correlations. When you want to 
exploit this benefit, you want to have as low correlations between the assets as possible. Low 
correlations means in this case low portfolio variance. When we are dealing with only two 
assets, it means that asset A is more likely to pay off when asset B is not doing so well. We 
say that the insurance value of asset A is increasing. When this is the case, and when the 
diversified portfolio performs better than the two assets isolated, we say that the individual 
assets are dominated.  
 
Diversification has been called the only “free lunch” in finance. It may seem too good to be 
true, with greater returns and smaller risk than holding individual assets. In fact, 
diversification is a free lunch (Campbell, 2000), if all you care for are mean returns and 
variances. As the name tells us, mean-variance investing only considers means and variances. 
Most investors care about more risk measures than only the simple variance. Since 
diversification eliminates the unsystematic risk, the chance of a big win and high payoffs is 
limited. The degree of diversification is dependent on the investors risk preferences.  
 
The Markowitz procedure of choosing a portfolio by finding the mean-variance portfolio 
demands a large number of estimates in the covariance matrix. To simplify the estimation of 
the covariance matrix, we can use index models. One suitable model is the single-index model 
(Bodie et al., 2011), using a broad weight-adjusted index. This index functions as a proxy for 
common macroeconomic factors. The single-index model is linear and therefore suitable to 
estimate the sensitivity coefficient of an asset on the proxy. This is done by linear regression, 
based on historical observations, and describes the relationship between a security´s excess 
return relative to the proxy index´ excess return. The regression equation, representing the 
single-index model is expressed as:  
 𝑟! − 𝑟! = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑟! − 𝑟! + 𝜀!" 
 
• 𝑟! − 𝑟!  is the excess return of a security 
(1) 
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• 𝛼! is the intercept, representing the security´s expected return when the proxy index 
excess return is zero 
• 𝛽! is the slope coefficient, describing the security´s sensitivity to the proxy index  
• 𝑟! − 𝑟!  is the excess return of the proxy index 
• 𝜀!" is the security´s residual at time t, representing unexpected events that are firm-
specific 
 
The regression equation shows how we can estimate a security´s risk and return profile. To do 
this, the estimates of alpha and beta are necessary, and these will describe the total risk of a 
security. The risk of an asset or a portfolio is divided into two groups; firm-specific risk 
(unsystematic risk) and systematic risk. The systematic risk is represented by the security´s 
beta and can be expressed as:  
 𝛽! = !"#(!!,  !!)!"#(!!)  
 
• 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟!,   𝑟!) is the covariance between the return of the security and the return of the 
proxy index 
• 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟!) is the variance of the proxy index´ return 
 
In the single-index model, the market index proxy´s beta is assumed to be equal to 1. If the 
security´s beta exceeds 1 the security is more volatile to movements in the market than the 
index. The firm specific risk, represented by the security´s alpha is often called the nonmarket 
risk premium (Bodie et al., 2011), and a large alpha (greater than zero) may be due to a 
underpriced security and hence a higher expected return. The alpha derived from the single-
index model is also known as Jensens alpha, after its inventor (Jensen, 1967). The null 
hypothesis in the single-index model is that the security´s alpha is equal to zero. Based on 
equation (1) and the knowledge on the estimates of alpha and beta, we are now able to derive 
the total risk of a security:  
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑟! − 𝑟! = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑟! − 𝑟! + 𝜀!") 
(2) 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
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 𝜎!! = 𝛽!! ∙ 𝜎!! + 𝜎! 𝑒!  
 
• 𝜎!! is the total variance of the return of a security 
• 𝛽!! ∙ 𝜎!!  is the systematic risk of a security 
• 𝜎! 𝑒!  is the variance of the firm-specific unexpected events 
 
Now that the total variance of the security is known, we can find the explanatory value of the 
regression equation. By using the estimates derived from the single-index model, we can find 
whether the variations in the return of the index can or cannot explain the variations in the 
return of the security. This measure is called the R2 ratio and describes the relationship 
between the explained variance and the total variance of a security. This ratio ranges from 0 
to 1 and a high R2 represents a high correlation between the return of the index and the return 
of the security. The expression for the R2 ratio is based on the estimates of the security´s 
variance:  
 𝑅! = 𝛽!! ∙ 𝜎!!𝛽!! ∙ 𝜎!! + 𝜎!(𝜀!) 	  	  
4.2 Capital Asset Pricing Model  
The Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM) is a part of the portfolio theory and was derived by 
William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965), Jan Mossin (1966) and Jack Treynor (1961). 
The model is building on the principle of diversification and the modern portfolio theory. The 
overall goal of CAPM is to show how a risky asset is valuated in a perfect market. The model 
gives us a precise prediction of the relationship between the risk and expected return of an 
asset. CAPM has two key functions (Bodie et al., 2011):  
1. Provide a benchmark rate of return when evaluating investments. For example if you 
want to find if the expected return for an asset is “fair” due to the asset´s risk profile.  
2. For assets that have not been traded in the marketplace, the model gives a prediction 
of the expected return of the asset.  
 
(6) 
(5) 
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The single-index model is a practical model that makes it easy to estimate the necessary 
parameters, described as a linear regression equation. The leap from this model based on 
modern portfolio theory, to CAPM is not very large. CAPM is more of a theoretical model 
assuming a simplified world, making it easier to find the consequences or outcomes of a 
certain investment decision. The assumptions in CAPM are stated to make individual 
investors more alike. Investors have homogenous expectations regarding the relationship 
between risk and expected return, all investors have the same investment horizon and there 
exists no transaction costs in the market. In addition, the model assumes that all investors can 
borrow or lend money at the risk-free rate of return, there are no income taxes, no inflation, 
no information asymmetry and one individual investor cannot affect the price of an asset. The 
final assumption about CAPM is that all capital markets are in equilibrium, which means that 
there are no arbitrage opportunities (Jones, 2002).  Equation (7) (Fama & French, 2003) gives 
us the model in formal terms:  
 𝐸 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝛽! 𝐸 𝑟! − 𝑟!  
 
• 𝐸 𝑟!  is the expected return on portfolio p 
• 𝑟! is the risk-free rate of return 
• 𝛽! is the measure of the contribution of portfolio p to the variance of the market 
portfolio as a fraction of the total variance of the market portfolio.  
• 𝐸(𝑟!) is the expected return for the market portfolio 
 
To describe portfolios that can be chosen when there exists only one risky asset and one risk-
free asset, we use the capital allocation line (CAL) (Ang, 2014). The line shows all the risk-
return combinations available to the investor. The capital allocation line can be expressed 
formally as:  
 𝐸 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝐸 𝑟 − 𝑟!𝜎 𝜎! 
 
• 𝐸 𝑟!  is the portfolios expected return 
• 𝑟!  is the risk-free rate of return 
• 𝐸 𝑟  is the risky asset´s rate of return 
(7) 
 
 
(8) 
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•   𝜎 and 𝜎!  is the standard deviation of the risky asset and the portfolio respectively  
 
4.3 Performance Measurements  
To be able to assess and compare individual fund managers performance we have to use 
different performance measures. Performance measures are both important for the investor 
and for the managers. The investors have to choose which fund to invest in, and the managers 
have to justify why one should buy an actively managed fund rather than a passively managed 
fund. In addition, the managers have to show the importance of their role and justify the fees 
and expenses for investing in a actively managed fund (Knight & Satchell, 2002). Which 
performance measure the investor believes is the most important criterion for choosing a fund, 
depends on the investors risk preferences. For example, if total return were the investor’s 
primary criterion for choosing a fund, he would probably think excess return is a more 
important measure than the Sharpe ratio. On the other hand, if the investor is more risk 
averse, he would probably think the performance measures considering risk is more important 
for choosing which fund to invest in. In this chapter I will present different performance 
measures used to evaluate and compare fund managers.  
 
4.3.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio is a performance measure named after William Sharpe, and is also called the 
reward-to-variability ratio. The ratio determine the excess return earned per unit of risk 
(Sharpe, 1994). The importance of the trade-off between excess return and risk is represented 
by the Sharpe ratio.  
Figure 3 The Capital Allocation Line  
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The capital allocation line (CAL) as mentioned in chapter 4.2 represents all the risk-return 
combinations an investor can face. The slope of the capital allocation line is the Sharpe ratio, 
because the slope equals the increased return per increased risk (Bodie et al., 2011). You use 
the capital allocation line to find the best combination of one risky and one risk-free asset to 
maximize the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is expressed as (Knight & Satchell, 2002):  
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝑟! − 𝑟!𝜎!  
 
• 𝑟! is the average portfolio return 
• 𝑟! is the average risk-free rate of return 
• 𝜎! is the standard deviation of the portfolio, representing the total risk 
 
When holding a portfolio, or a mutual fund, the Sharpe ratio will improve by diversification. 
By comparing different funds Sharpe ratio, based on historical data, you can find the fund 
with the highest return relative to the funds risk. The fund with the highest Sharpe ratio has 
the best risk-adjusted return – the higher Sharp ratio, the better.  
 
4.3.2 The M2 measure 
The M2 measure (Modigliani-squared) is a ratio, like the Sharpe ratio, which focuses on total 
risk, and the M2 measure is also a measure of the risk-adjusted performance of a portfolio. 
The measure compares the return of a risk-adjusted portfolio, consisting of a combination of 
risky and risk-free assets, and the return of the benchmark index. The risk-adjusted portfolio 
is constructed such that the portfolio and the benchmark index have the same standard 
deviation. In this way, we can compute the M2 by comparing only the returns (Bodie et al., 
2011):  
 𝑀! = 𝑟!∗ − 𝑟! 
 
• 𝑟!∗ is the risk-adjusted portfolio return 
• 𝑟! is the return of the market portfolio  
 
(9) 
(10) 
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When comparing the M2 measure with the Sharpe ratio, we see that both measures produce 
the same ranking of funds or portfolios. This means that the best fund according to the Sharpe 
ratio is also the best fund according to the M2 measure (Knight & Satchell, 2002). The 
relationship between the M2 measure and the Sharpe ratio can be expressed as:  
 𝑀! = 𝑟!∗ − 𝑟! = 𝑅!∗ − 𝑅! = 𝑆!𝜎! − 𝑆!𝜎! = 𝑆! − 𝑆! 𝜎! 
 
• 𝑅!∗ is the excess return of the portfolio 
• 𝑅! is the excess return of the market portfolio  
• 𝑆! is the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio 
• 𝑆! is the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio 
• 𝜎! is the standard deviation of the market portfolio 
 
The M2 measure is more sensible in itself than the Sharpe ratio, because the M2 measure 
computes how many basis points better or worse the portfolio has performed compared to the 
market portfolio (Modigliani & Modigliani, 1997), while the Sharpe ratio itself does not 
provide any information unless you compare it to other funds, portfolios or indices. 	  
4.3.3 Tracking Error and the Information Ratio 
Tracking error (also called active risk) measures the volatility of the excess return between a 
fund and its benchmark index (Morningstar, 2014d). A source of tracking error is when the 
managers try to outperform their benchmark index. The goal is to minimize the tracking error 
while maximizing the relative return, where the risk associated with tracking error is reflected 
as the volatility of the excess return (Hwang & Satchell, 2001). How consistent the funds 
excess return is, can be represented by the tracking error. The tracking error reflects how 
close a funds investments are to its benchmark index, hence the benchmark index has a 
tracking error of zero. It also describes how volatile the funds return is relative to the 
benchmark, and one can therefore say that the tracking error is a measure of excess risk. The 
tracking error tells us how much the excess return of the fund varies. Tracking error can be 
calculated as (Vanguard, 2009):  
 𝑇𝐸 = 𝜎(!!!!!) 
 
(11) 
(12) 
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• 𝜎(!!!!!) is the standard deviation of the excess return of the fund 
 
Information ratio is a risk-adjusted measure focusing on the unsystematic risk (tracking error). 
It measures how much excess return the manager generated relative to the unsystematic risk. 
As stated in chapter 4.1 the unsystematic risk can be eliminated by diversification, and in 
principle when taking on such risk, the investor should get a reward reflected as excess return. 
Positive information ratio represents excess return created by the fund manager, and negative 
information ratio represents underperformance compared to the benchmark index 
(Morningstar, 2014a). High information ratio is generated when the funds are able to deliver 
high returns, when the benchmark index has lower returns and when the tracking error is low. 
The information ratio can be expressed as (Bodie et al., 2011):  
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝛼!𝜎(𝑒!) 
• 𝛼! is the funds risk-adjusted excess return 
• 𝜎(𝑒!) is the funds unsystematic risk 
 
When an active portfolio manager is restricted to invest in a certain investment universe, the 
same way my sample of mutual funds are restricted to invest at least 80% in stocks listed at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, a different expression of the information ratio can be used. This is 
the case when the portfolio has the same level of systematic risk as its benchmark index, i.e. a 
beta equal to 1 (Goodwin, 1998). However, the two calculations of the information ratio 
would not have a large deviation if the portfolio betas were close to 1. In case of beta equal to 
1, the information ratio can be expressed as:  
 𝐼𝑅 = 𝑟! − 𝑟!𝑇𝐸  
 
• 𝑟! − 𝑟!  is the excess return of the fund 
• 𝑇𝐸 is the tracking error 
 
The higher the information ratio, the more consistent is the manager. The information ratio is 
intended to reflect the amount of special information the active manager has obtained and 
how this is reflected by the excess return (Goodwin, 1998).  
(13) 
(14) 
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4.3.4 Excess Return 
Excess return of a mutual fund is a term widely used when evaluating and comparing the 
performance of mutual funds. Excess return shows how a fund has performed versus a 
benchmark index over a specific period of time. It shows whether the fund has out- or 
underperformed the benchmark and the excess return can be either positive, negative or zero 
(Vanguard, 2009). A funds excess return is computed from the funds net asset value (NAV) 
and from the benchmark´s NAV. From the NAV´s we can compute the funds and the index´ 
return, and excess return can be expressed as:  
 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =   𝑟! − 𝑟! 
 
• 𝑟! is the fund return  
• 𝑟!  is the index return 
 
NAV for a fund does not include the management fees demanded to hold an active managed 
fund. This means that the excess return shows explicitly if the fund is out- or underperforming 
the benchmark index. Excess return is not risk-adjusted and does not say anything about the 
funds risk profile.  	  
4.3.5 Total Shareholder Return 
Total shareholder return (TSR) is a performance measure representing the aggregated return 
to the shareholder measured as the value growth in a portfolio (Nordea, 2015b). Total 
shareholder return is a measure best fitted for evaluating long-term value creation in markets 
that are often short-term orientated, like the stock market. The measure can be positive or 
negative; a positive TSR represents a growth in the funds net asset value from the time of the 
initial investment, and a negative TSR represents a decrease in the net asset value. TSR is 
expressed as a percentage change in net asset value, and Morningstar uses this measure to 
explain mutual funds value growth versus the value growth of the fund´s benchmark index 
(Morningstar, 2015a). TSR can be expressed formally as:  
 𝑇𝑆𝑅 =   𝑁𝐴𝑉! − 𝑁𝐴𝑉!𝑁𝐴𝑉!  
 
(16) 
(15) 
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• NAVt is the value of the fund at the end of the period 
• NAV0 is the value of the fund at the beginning of the period 
 
In chapter 5.15 I will show how total shareholder return can give us the ending value of an 
initial investment of 1000 kr of each fund.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28	  
5 Empirical Analysis  
5.1 Data Sets  
The data sets I have used in this study are monthly net asset values for all of the mutual funds 
and for the benchmark index. The net asset values are from January 1997 to December 2013. 
Four of the funds included in this study were launched after 1997, and for these funds I have 
data from their start date to December 2013. When studying the periods of bullish and bearish 
markets, determined in chapter 3.2, I include those funds that have existed the whole period to 
achieve the most accurate results. I received the data sets with the net asset values from Truls 
Henrik Hollen at Oslo Børs Information Services.  
 
5.2 Choice of Funds 
The basic idea when choosing funds for my research was to choose the funds individual 
investors invest in. There exist a lot of Norwegian mutual equity funds, but not all of them are 
suited for a regular person to invest his savings in. This is substantially because of the 
different minimum investment criteria each fund has. A regular person with a regular salary 
would probably not invest in a mutual fund that demands a minimum investment of 10 
million NOK. When I chose the funds to research, I had five criteria for each fund:  
- The fund has to be a Norwegian mutual equity fund following the classification rules 
described in chapter 2.1.1. 
- The fund is actively managed, i.e. not an index fund 
- The fund has not closed during the research period 
- The minimum investment does not exceed 100 000 NOK 
- The fund is a UCITS fund 
 
The funds included in this research are presented in Appendix 1. UCITS stands for 
“Undertakings for Collective Investments In Transferable Securities” and UCITS funds are 
subject to the EU funds directive. The UCITS directives are implemented in Norway through 
The Act on securities funds, where §1-2 says that UCITS funds are funds following the 
regulations in The Act on securities funds chapter 6 (Verdipapirfondloven, 2012). These 
regulations limit funds on how they can invest. There are restrictions on how much one single 
stock can be weighted in the fund, and the regulations function as diversification rules. One 
single stock cannot exceed 10% of the total value of the fund, and stocks with weights in the 
 29	  
fund between 5% and 10% can maximum sum up to 40% of total value of the fund 
(Morningstar, 2013). After UCITS was implemented in the security market it started to serve 
as quality recognition for investors. The investors will know that the portfolio managers in the 
fund are not able to take on extreme bets in one stock – UCITS ensures diversified funds. 
Funds that do not want, or are not allowed, to be a UCITS fund are called AIF´s (Alternative 
Investment Funds). These funds have more freedom when choosing their investments, but 
they are also associated with higher risk. Funds labelled as an AIF has to follow the AIFMD 
(Alternative Investment Funds Management Directive) (KPMG, 2014).  
 
Based on the criteria I have set for my sample of funds, the results I get may be influenced by 
survivorship bias. The survivorship bias is present when mutual funds that have been closed 
or merged during the period of research are not included in the study. Mutual funds closing 
tend to do so due to lack of performance or merging into other funds to hide poor 
performance (Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996). When survivorship bias exists in a sample of 
mutual funds, the consequence is that the results of performance calculations may be 
overstated relative to the true performance. In my study, where I only include funds that have 
not been closed during the period, the average returns of the funds will not be representative 
for the whole fund universe. The results will only reflect the average returns for long-term 
survivors, and the performance of the portfolio manager may be better than if I had included 
all funds (Bodie et al., 2011). When comparing my fund universe, represented by the equally-
weighted portfolio, against the benchmark index, it is important to keep in mind that 
survivorship bias may exist and that this portfolio does not reflect the whole fund universe 
existing of both open, closed and merged mutual funds.  
 
5.3 Choice of Benchmark Index 
Based on the information about the most relevant indices described in chapter 2.2, the most 
appropriate benchmarks would be either OSEBX or OSEFX. Since OSEFX is a weight-
adjusted version of OSEBX, and all of my funds except one have this index as their 
benchmark index, OSEFX is the most appropriate benchmark to use in this research. In 
addition, OSEFX are required to follow the same regulations as UCITS funds. This makes 
OSEFX an even more accurate benchmark to compare the funds against.  	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5.4 Net Asset Value 
The net asset value (NAV) is the value of a security when buying or selling, fees excluded 
(Morningstar, 2014b). The NAV is the value of each share, also called the per-share price. 
The number of shares outstanding in the fund changes all the time, depending on the period’s 
net subscription. The net asset value are calculated every day, usually from the end-value, and 
can be calculated as (Bodie et al., 2011):  
 𝑁𝐴𝑉 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠  𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  
 
NAV represents the net value of the fund divided by each share. NAV is used to calculate the 
funds return for each period, as I will describe in the next section. Because all of my 
calculations are based on net asset values, I will not consider the management fees when 
evaluating and ranking the funds.  
 
5.5 Rate of Return 
The rate of return of an investment in a mutual fund depends whether the funds pay dividends 
or not. The funds in my research do not pay dividends, and the rate of return for these funds 
are measured as the increase or decrease in the net asset value. When calculating the rate of 
return for funds that do not pay dividends, you simply measure the relationship between the 
net asset values for each period (Bodie et al., 2011):  
 𝑟!,!!! = 𝑁𝐴𝑉! − 𝑁𝐴𝑉!!!𝑁𝐴𝑉!!!  
• 𝑟!,!!! is the rate of return in the period 
• 𝑁𝐴𝑉! is the per-share price at time t  
• 𝑁𝐴𝑉!!!is the per-share price at t-1  
 
5.6 Risk-free Rate of Return  
When measuring the performance of the funds we have to use a risk-free rate of return. This 
rate is supposed to reflect an investment in a risk-free security, even though you can never say 
something is completely risk free. In this context, the NIBOR rate is commonly used. NIBOR 
(Norwegian Interbank Offering Rate) is a term capturing different Norwegian money market 
(18) 
(17) 
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rates at different maturities. NIBOR exists with maturities from one week to a year. Oslo 
Stock Exchange is the calculation agent of this rate, and it is calculated as the average interest 
rate from chosen panel banks, such as DNB Bank ASA, Danske Bank and Swedbank (Finans 
Norge, 2015). The NIBOR rate is the rate the individual panel banks would charge when 
lending NOK to another active, leading Norwegian bank.  
 
When comparing the fund returns and the return an investor would get from holding the 
money in a Norwegian bank, the most common NIBOR rate to use is the NIBOR 3-month 
rate. This is also the rate Morningstar uses in their models to calculate a funds return in excess 
of the risk-free rate (Morningstar, 2014c). Based on this, I choose the NIBOR 3-month rate of 
return as my risk-free rate in this research. To find a risk-free rate for the whole period to 
compare to the total return of the funds in this research, I calculated the average of 203 
NIBOR 3-month observations. This average is used when I calculate the performance 
measures in chapter 5.10 and 5.11.   
 
	   1997-­‐2013	  
NIBOR	  3-­‐month	   4,21%	  
Table	  1	  Risk-­‐free	  rate	  of	  return	  
 
5.7 Other Studies on Mutual Fund Performance 
There have been done several researches on mutual fund performance. In this chapter I will 
present some of these research papers and their results.  
 
Lars Qvigstad Sørensen did a paper on the performance of all Norwegian equity mutual funds 
at the Oslo Stock Exchange. He found no significant alpha for the funds when creating an 
equally-weighted portfolio of all the mutual funds (Sørensen, 2009). This means he found no 
evidence of abnormal risk-adjusted return for the funds relative to a benchmark index. He 
used the OSEFX as benchmark index for as long as the index has existed, and prior to the 
establishment of this index he used OSEAX. His period of research was from 1982 to 2008, 
and he has included funds opening and closing in the period. In addition, he did not pick 
funds like I have done, and this suggests that his and my research should not necessarily yield 
the same results regarding the abnormal risk-adjusted returns.  
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The same has been concluded in another paper from the Journal of Banking and Finance, 
researching all Norwegian mutual funds in the period 2000-2010 (Gallefoss, Hansen, 
Haukaas, & Molnár, 2015). Their conclusion was that Norwegian mutual funds are both out- 
and underperforming the benchmark index, but aggregated they underperformed the 
benchmark index by approximately the management fees. 
 
Fama and French (2010) wrote a paper on the same subject, but with U.S. equity mutual funds 
in the period 1984-2006. They found that the aggregate portfolio of the funds is close to the 
market portfolio, but the management fees lower the returns to the investors (Fama & French, 
2010). Nevertheless, if they exclude the cost in fund expense ratio, they find evidence of both 
negative and positive alpha values.  
 
5.8 Descriptive Statistics  
In table 2 the mean monthly return and mean monthly standard deviation for each fund for the 
whole period is presented in descending order with respect to the mean monthly return. 
OSEFX is included to compare the funds against both each other and to the benchmark.  
 
	   𝒓𝒑	   𝝈𝒑	   Maximum	  value	   Minimum	  value	  
Delphi	  Norge	   1.22%	   7.06%	   23.01%	   -­‐24.93%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   1.17%	   6.91%	   27.25%	   -­‐27.38%	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   1.12%	   5.91%	   17.59%	   -­‐29.77%	  
Atlas	  Norge	  	   1.11%	   7.46%	   36.85%	   -­‐25.25%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   1.10%	   6.17%	   20.13%	   -­‐27.52%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   1.02%	   5.83%	   15.94%	   -­‐23.90%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.98%	   6.08%	   14.91%	   -­‐29.49%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.98%	   6.04%	   17.56%	   -­‐25.51%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.92%	   6.08%	   14.85%	   -­‐27.17%	  
OSEFX	   0.91%	   6.11%	   16.52%	   -­‐27.17%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.90%	   5.98%	   17.10%	   -­‐27.01%	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.89%	   6.01%	   16.82%	   -­‐24.09%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.87%	   6.11%	   15.51%	   -­‐28.83%	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.83%	   6.32%	   18.74%	   -­‐28.85%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  	   0.81%	   6.27%	   14.59%	   -­‐29.29%	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.79%	   6.16%	   17.75%	   -­‐28.82%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   0.79%	   5.97%	   16.64%	   -­‐26.18%	  
Dnb	  Norge	   0.78%	   5.94%	   15.81%	   -­‐24.12%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   0.68%	   6.07%	   16.80%	   -­‐26.22%	  
Table	  2	  Mean	  monthly	  returns	  and	  standard	  deviations	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From the results in table 2 we see that both all funds and the index (OSEFX) had a positive 
average monthly return in the period 1997-2013. However, there are interesting differences. 
Some of the funds had a higher monthly return than the benchmark, and others had lower 
monthly return. The distribution of funds beating the benchmark and funds underperforming 
the benchmark is equally shared – 50% of the funds beat the benchmark with respect to mean 
monthly returns and 50% did not. However, this has to be seen relative to the funds volatility, 
represented by their mean monthly standard deviation. This is called risk-adjusted return. 
 
Four of the nine funds beating OSEFX with respect to mean monthly return also had lower 
standard deviation than OSEFX. For these funds (Danske Invest Norge 1, Danske Invest 
Norge 2, Holberg Norge and KLP Aksje Norge) we can conclude that they outperformed 
OSEFX on a monthly basis at the same time as they had lower volatility than the index. 
 
The fund with most variations in the monthly return is Atlas Norge with a standard deviation 
of 7,46%. To justify this we see that this fund had higher monthly return than OSEFX. The 
fund with the lowest volatility is Holberg Norge with a standard deviation of 5,83%. This 
fund had a higher monthly return than OSEFX, but lower risk.  
 
The maximum and minimum values show how much the value of a fund can vary within a 
single month. KLP Aksje Norge had the biggest drop (-29,77%) during a one-month period. 
The highest gain for a one-month period was generated by Atlas Norge (36,85%). It is also 
interesting to see that the variations in maximum values were much bigger than the variations 
in minimum values. The biggest loss for each fund during one month lies between -24,12% 
and -29,77%, while the biggest gain for each fund during one month lies in the interval 
14,59% to 36,85%.  
 
5.8.1 Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) describes the performance of the funds in a different way 
than average numbers do. As described in chapter 4.3.5, TSR reflects the value creation a 
fund has generated during a specific period. TSR can be calculated from day to day, but it 
gives a better picture of the growth (or decline) when calculated over a longer period of time. 
In table 3 the value growth from 1997 to 2013 is presented. I added an equally-weighted 
portfolio consisting of an equally share of all the funds.  
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Fond	  (1997-­‐2013)	   Total	  Shareholder	  Return	   Ranking	  
Delphi	  Norge	   464.23%	   1	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   428.95%	   2	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   386.26%	   3	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   330.09%	   4	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  (1999-­‐2013)*	   312.55%	   5	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   300.98%	   6	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   286.81%	   7	  
OSEFX	   271.92%	   8	  
Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   267.82%	   9	  
Odin	  Norge	   250.06%	   10	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   250.04%	   11	  
Atlas	  Norge	  (1998-­‐2013)*	   247.92%	   12	  
OSEBX	   243.10%	   13	  
Holberg	  Norge	  (2001-­‐2013)*	   229.67%	   14	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   225.24%	   15	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   212.07%	   16	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   211.44%	   17	  
Dnb	  Norge	   201.26%	   18	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   198.27%	   19	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   147.80%	   20	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  (2001-­‐2013)*	   137.10%	   21	  
Risk	  Free	  Investment	   100.24%	   22	  
*	  Fund	  established	  after	  1997	   	   	  
Table	  3	  Total	  Shareholder	  Return	  
TSR represents the aggregated return of a fund, an index or a single stock. The numeric value 
of TSR is equal to the percentage growth in the funds net asset value from the first observed 
NAV to the last observed NAV. In my research the first observed NAV for the funds is 
31.01.1997. For the funds that were not established in 1997, marked with a star (*), TSR is 
calculated from their launch date. The last observed NAV for all of the funds are 31.12.2013.  
 
Table 3 shows that Delphi Norge was the fund with the highest growth in NAV through the 
17-year period. This funds NAV increased by 464,23%. In comparison, OSEFX´s NAV  
increased by 271,92%, and Delphi Norge had a greater value creation in this period than its 
benchmark index. Storebrand Optima Norge and the other funds marked with a star (*) are 
difficult to compare with respect to TSR as they are measured for a shorter time period than 
the other funds.  
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If your investment was risk-free, the value of the investment done in 1997 would have grown 
by 100,24% in 2013. This is supposed to reflect the value growth if the money was placed in a 
safe bank account instead of in a more risky fund. The best fund according to total 
shareholder return had a value in 2013 almost 5 times as big as its value in 1997. This shows 
that in the long-run the value of the funds increase more than they decrease, and there is 
reason to believe that saving in mutual funds will be more popular in the future. This is partly 
because of the decreased interest rates from investing your money in bank deposits. In 
comparison, a bank deposit in 1997 would have been doubled in value in 2013. 
 
One of the best funds with respect to monthly average returns and standard deviation, Danske 
Invest Norge 1, had a lower TSR than the benchmark index. This can be explained by Danske 
Invest Norge 1´s higher Sharpe ratio than OSEFX (see table 5), and this funds combination of 
risk and return may be favourable relative to OSEFX.  
 
The equally-weighted portfolio consisting of all the funds underperformed OSEFX based on 
TSR. The underperformance is only by 4,1 percentage points, but it shows that on average my 
fund universe did not beat the market when we only look at the absolute numbers.  
 
OSEBX, together with OSEFX, are included to show the value growth in the overall 
Norwegian equity market between 1997 and 2013. We see that OSEBX had a lower total 
return than OSEFX, but OSEBX still outperformed eight of the funds with respect to total 
return. However, two of these funds were not established until 2001.  
 
5.9 Results From the Regression Analysis 
The regression analysis done in this research is based on the regression equation from the 
single-index model. From this model, the estimates necessary to analyse the sample of funds 
is derived and enables me to describe each funds combination of risk and return and compare 
it to their benchmark index. The regression is linear and is formally expressed as:  
 𝑟! = 𝛼! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑟! + 𝜀!" 
 
In this regression, the return of the funds, 𝑟!, is the dependent variable. This is the variable the 
regression analysis predicts. The return of the benchmark index, 𝑟! , is the independent 
(19) 
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variable used to predict the dependent variable. When conducting the regression, we find 
estimates of the variance of each fund, represented by the alpha and beta values. In addition, 
the residuals of the regression model, 𝜀!", at time t is estimated. The residuals reflect the 
random disturbance. This error term has an expected mean value of zero. 
 
	   Alpha	  (p-­‐value)	   	  	  	  	  Beta	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  R2	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.003	  (0.32)	   0.99	   0.78	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.000	  (0.50)	   0.99	   0.98	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.003	  (0.19)	   1.14	   0.83	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.002	  (0.29)	   0.96	   0.90	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.000	  (0.99)	   0.98	   0.95	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.001	  (0.55)	   0.98	   0.95	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.003	  (0.20)	   1.08	   0.84	  
Dnb	  Norge	   -­‐0.001	  (0.29)	   0.97	   0.98	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.000	  (0.67)	   0.99	   0.96	  
Holberg	  Norge	  	   0.002	  (0.28)	   0.89	   0.88	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   0.001	  (0.27)	   0.94	   0.95	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.001	  (0.33)	   0.98	   0.97	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.002	  (0.08)*	   0.99	   0.95	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.001	  (0.75)	   0.92	   0.82	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   -­‐0.001	  (0.49)	   0.99	   0.94	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.001	  (0.31)	   0.97	   0.93	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.000	  (0.63)	   1.00	   0.98	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  	   0.000	  (0.75)	   0.96	   0.93	  
*Significant	  at	  a	  significance	  level	  of	  10%	   	   	   	  
Table	  4	  Results	  from	  regression	  analyses 	  
Table 4 presents the results from the estimates derived from the regression model. The first 
estimates, the funds alpha values, represent the unsystematic risk discussed in chapter 4.1. 
These values tells us whether the fund did or did not manage to generate risk-adjusted excess 
return during the period of research relative to the benchmark, OSEFX. The numbers in the 
brackets is the p-value of the alpha´s. These values help determining whether the alpha´s are 
statistically significant or not. To determine the significance I chose a significance level of 
5% (one can also use a 10% significance level), meaning that the null hypothesis (𝐻!:𝛼! = 0) 
will be rejected if the p-value is below 0,05. If the p-value is higher than 0,05 we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis, and I have no evidence to say that the fund generated excess risk-adjusted 
return relative to OSEFX. This is the case for all of my funds. Some of the funds had positive 
alpha values, which indicate positive excess risk-adjusted return, but because these excess 
returns are so small, we say that they are not statistically significant. The same applies for 
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those with a negative alpha – they had negative risk-adjusted excess return but it is not 
statistical significant. Based on this test, I do not have evidence to say that any of my funds 
generated significant positive or negative risk-adjusted excess return.  
 
My result was somewhat expected, primarily because of two reasons. The first reason is that 
the other studies on the same subject have found the same result, as stated in chapter 5.7. The 
other reason is that information is easily available for all agents in the market. There are strict 
regulations preventing inside information and it demands either great skills or great luck for a 
manager to generate statistical significant risk-adjusted excess return over a longer period.  
 
The estimated beta values of the funds tell us the proportion of systematic risk the fund is 
bearing relative to OSEFX. A beta value below 1 represents lower systematic risk than 
OSEFX and a beta higher than 1 represents more systematic risk than OSEFX. As we see 
from table 4, most of the funds had a beta close to 1. The two funds sticking out is Atlas 
Norge with a beta of 1,14, and Holberg Norge with a beta of 0,89. The beta of Atlas Norge is 
telling us that this fund had more risk than OSEFX. The natural way of justifying this risk is if 
Atlas Norge also generated higher return than OSEFX. Holberg Norge had a quite low beta, 
and lower risk means we could expect lower returns. The average beta for all of the funds for 
the whole period is 0,98. This shows that in the long run, the funds volatility relative to the 
volatility of their benchmark index does not differ much, and on average the funds were not 
exposed to higher systematic risk than the benchmark. However, this conclusion is only valid 
for my sample of funds and does not represent the whole fund universe.  
 
In chapter 2.1.1 I described the criteria for a mutual fund to be classified into a group. The 
mutual funds in my research are geographically classified as Norwegian, and this means at 
least 80% of the funds capital has to be invested in Norwegian listed securities. The last 20% 
is the reason the funds have different betas and systematic risk than OSEFX. The opportunity 
the funds have to invest 20% elsewhere than in only Norwegian listed securities may give the 
fund lower or higher systematic risk, since OSEFX invest 100% in listed Norwegian 
securities and hence a beta of 1.  
 
The R2 for each fund tells us if the regression model is a good fit for the data sets and how the 
independent variable (OSEFX) influences the dependent variable (the fund). When discussing 
the funds R2 a general range for this measure is useful (Morningstar, 2015b):  
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• 0,7 – 1 = high correlation between the fund and the index 
• 0,4 – 0,7 = average correlation between the fund and the index 
• 0,01 – 0,4 = low correlation between the fund and the index 
 
We see that all of the funds are located in the range between 0,7 – 1 which represents high 
correlation between OSEFX and the fund. When R2 is 1, the regression model manages to 
explain all the variations in the fund. This is not the case for any of my funds, but Storebrand 
Norge is the fund with the highest R2. A R2 of 0,98 means that 98% of the variations in 
Storebrand Norge can be explained by the variations in OSEFX. Only 2% of the variations in 
Storebrand Norge are variations that cannot be explained by the variations in OSEFX. This 
funds high R2 ratio tells us that Storebrand Norge is a fund investing closely to its benchmark 
index.  
 
The fund with the lowest R2, Alfred Berg Gambak, is still in the range of high correlation, but 
here the regression model can explain only 78% of the variations in the fund. 22% of the 
variations in Alfred Berg Gambak are not explained by variations in OSEFX. R2 can imply 
how close the funds investments is to the benchmark index, and it seems Alfred Berg 
Gambaks portfolio deviates more from OSEFX than Storebrand Norge does, and it might be a 
fund taking bigger bets.  
 
5.10 Sharpe Ratio  
As explained in chapter 4.3.1, the Sharpe ratio is a measure describing the funds and the index 
risk and return profile. The way to optimize the risk-return profile in an investment is to 
locate at the capital allocation line and find the best combination of assets to maximize the 
Sharpe ratio.  
 
To calculate the Sharpe ratio I use the numbers presented in Appendix 4. The risk-free rate of 
return I get from table 1. The Sharpe Ratio for Alfred Berg Gambak is:  
 𝑆𝑅!"!!"#$ = 0,1497− 0,04210,2392  𝑆𝑅!"!!"#$ = 0,4496 
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In table 5 the Sharpe Ratio for each fund is presented. I have also ranked the funds after the 
value of the Sharpe Ratio.   	  
	   Sharpe	  Ratio	   Ranking	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   0.496	   1	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.467	   2	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.461	   3	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.450	   4	  
Holberg	  Norge	  	   0.434	   5	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.394	   6	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.391	   7	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.386	   8	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.351	   9	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.345	   10	  
OSEFX	   0.344	   11	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.336	   12	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.317	   13	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.282	   14	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  	   0.276	   15	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   0.275	   16	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.271	   17	  
Dnb	  Norge	   0.270	   18	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   0.201	   19	  
Table	  5	  Results	  and	  ranking	  of	  the	  Sharpe	  Ratio	  
Assuming a rational investor with mean-variance preferences, the optimal investment 
decision would be to invest in the fund with the highest Sharpe ratio. In this fund the investor 
would get the highest return relative to the risk he has undertaken. From table 5 we see that 
the three best funds with respect to the risk-return profile in the period 1997-2013 were KLP 
Aksje Norge, Delphi Norge and Carnegie Aksje Norge. OSEFX had a Sharpe Ratio of 0,344. 
This means that the index have during the research period had a greater return relative to the 
risk than eight of the 18 funds.  
 
5.11 M2  
In chapter 4.3.2 I described the M2 measure and how it is related to the Sharpe Ratio. This 
relationship is what I will use to calculate the M2 measure for the funds. To calculate the M2 
measure I use the Sharpe Ratio for each fund from table 5, and the annualized standard 
deviation for OSEFX from Appendix 4.  
 𝑀!"!!"#$! = 0,4496− 0,344   ×  0,2116 
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𝑀!"!!"#$! = 0,0223 	  
In table 6 the M2 measure for each fund is presented along with the rankings of the funds.  	  
	   M2	   Ranking	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.032	   1	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.026	   2	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.025	   3	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.022	   4	  
Holberg	  Norge	   0.019	   5	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.010	   6	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.009	   7	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.008	   8	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.001	   9	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.000	   10	  
Odin	  Norge	   -­‐0.001	   11	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐0.006	   12	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   -­‐0.013	   13	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   -­‐0.014	   14	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.015	   15	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   -­‐0.016	   16	  
Dnb	  Norge	   -­‐0.016	   17	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.030	   18	  
Table	  6	  Results	  and	  ranking	  of	  the	  M2	  measure	  
From table 6 we see that the rankings are the same as the rankings from the Sharpe Ratio in 
table 5; KLP Aksje Norge, Delphi Norge and Carnegie Aksje Norge are the funds with the 
highest M2 during the period 1997-2013. 
 
A postitive M2 means that the fund outperforms the benchmark relative to its risk. The M2 
measure is therefore a risk-adjusted measure. A negative M2 means that the fund has 
underperformed the benchmark. We see that 50% of my funds according to the M2 measure 
underperformed OSEFX, which has a M2 of zero.  
 
5.12 Tracking Error and Information Ratio 
The tracking error and the information ratio, as described in chapter 4.3.3, are measures 
concerning the excess return of the funds and its variations. To calculate the tracking error 
and the information ratio for the funds, I have used the values presented in Appendix 4. All of 
the funds in my study have a beta close to 1. As discussed in chapter 4.3.3, the beta estimates 
allows me to compute the information ratio using the funds excess returns.  
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   𝑇𝐸!"!!"#$ = 𝜎 !!!!! = 0,2173	  𝐼𝑅!"!!"#$ = 0,0350,2173	  𝐼𝑅!"!!"#$ = 0,1611	  
 
In table 7 I have presented the funds information ratio and their ranking with respect to the 
information ratio. The funds respective tracking error is presented as well.  
 
	   Information	  ratio	   Ranking	   Tracking	  error	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.704	   1	   4.09%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.403	   2	   6.37%	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.379	   3	   10.91%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.161	   4	   21.73%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.158	   5	   6.38%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.113	   6	   7.95%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   0.098	   7	   15.17%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.092	   8	   29.43%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.019	   9	   6.14%	  
Odin	  Norge	   -­‐0.019	   10	   14.96%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   -­‐0.020	   11	   5.12%	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   -­‐0.151	   12	   7.29%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   -­‐0.176	   13	   7.31%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐0.201	   14	   2.81%	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   -­‐0.274	   15	   5.51%	  
Dnb	  Norge	   -­‐0.320	   16	   5.41%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.598	   17	   5.12%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.600	   18	   2.66%	  
Table	  7	  Information	  ratio	  and	  tracking	  error	  
From table 7 we see that 50% of the funds had a positive information ratio. A positive 
information ratio means that the fund has generated positive excess return relative to the 
benchmark, adjusted for the risk the fund has taken. Negative information ratio means 
negative excess return and that the fund has not been able to generate a positive return on the 
active risk it has taken. This distribution matches the distribution from chapter 5.8 where 50% 
of the funds had a greater mean monthly return. It also matches the distribution of the M2 
measure in chapter 5.11, where 50% of the funds outperformed OSEFX.  
 
The three funds with the highest information ratio (KLP Aksje Norge, Carnegie Aksje Norge 
and Delphi Norge) are the funds with the greatest excess return relative to the unsystematic 
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risk, represented by the tracking error. The tracking error tells us how much variation there 
are in the funds excess return. To be able to generate stabilized excess return relative to the 
benchmark over a long period of time, the aim is to minimize the tracking error.  
 
5.13 Hypothesis Testing 
When performing a regression analysis there are certain elements necessary to examine. 
These elements are properties related to the data sets, and will give an indication if the results 
from the regression are reliable or not. When validating the reliability of my results I have 
performed tests of the residuals testing for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and non-
normality. These test are done based on assumptions underlying the regression model I have 
used. My regression model follows the method known as the method of ordinary least squares 
(OLS). This is a method helping to fit a straight line to the data set. By finding the best fit to 
the straight line means taking the every vertical distance from the point of the observation 
line, square it and then minimize the total sum of squares (Brooks, 2008). OLS is a method 
where you find estimates to minimize the total sum of squares, and these estimators are the 
alpha and beta values. When the assumptions underlying the model I regress are fulfilled, I 
know that the estimators are the best, linear, unbiased estimators (BLUE). 
 
5.13.1 Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
Heteroscedasticity is present if the variance of the residuals is not constant. This is not 
preferable, we want the residuals to be homoscedastic, i.e. have a constant variance. 
Heteroscedasticity can therefore be expressed as:  
 𝑉 𝜀! ≠ 𝜎! 
 
The tests null hypothesis is that the residuals are homoscedastic. The alternative hypothesis 
will then be that the residuals are heteroscedastic. This test depends on the p-values of the test 
statistics (𝜌!), and is used to determine whether the residuals of each fund are heteroscedastic 
or not. In table 8 the results from the test are presented.  
 
 	  	  
(20) 
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   𝝆𝒔	   P-­‐value	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.874	   0.00	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.985	   0.00	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.947	   0.00	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.951	   0.00	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.973	   0.00	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.975	   0.00	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.917	   0.00	  
DNB	  Norge	   0.986	   0.00	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.968	   0.00	  
Holberg	  Norge	   0.929	   0.00	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.970	   0.00	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   0.989	   0.00	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   0.972	   0.00	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.889	   0.00	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.958	   0.00	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.970	   0.00	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.989	   0.00	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   0.956	   0.00	  
Table	  8	  Spearman	  Rank	  Correlation	  test	  results	  	  
The decision rule is that if the p-value is lower than 0,05, we reject the null hypothesis 
(𝐻!:𝜌! = 0), and keep the alternative hypothesis. From the table we see that the null 
hypothesis is rejected for all of the funds, since the p-value is zero for all funds, and I do not 
have evidence to say that the residuals of the funds are homoscedastic. I have to keep the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that the residuals do not have constant variance, i.e. 
heteroscedasticity exist.  
 
This means I have not fulfilled the assumption underlying the model stating constant variance 
of the residuals. But the OLS estimators still remain unbiased, consistent and asymptotically 
normal (Stock & Watson, 2012). The consequence of this violation is that OLS is no longer 
the most efficient estimator, but it is still unbiased.  
 
5.13.2 Durbin-Watson Autocorrelation Test 
When using the method of OLS, the residuals have to be independent. This means no 
correlation between the residual at time t and the residual at time t+1. If the residuals are 
dependent and correlated, we say that there exists autocorrelation between the residuals. To 
be certain that the residuals are independent and not correlated, I have performed a test called 
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Durbin-Watson. In addition, I have made plots showing the residuals versus the lagged 
residuals. The plot for Alfred Berg Gambak is presented in Appendix 4.1. The test statistics 
are presented in table 9. 
 
	   Durbin-­‐Watson	  (d)	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   1.474*	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   1.773	  
Atlas	  Norge	   1.522*	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   1.910	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   1.982	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   1.982	  
Delphi	  Norge	   2.029	  
DNB	  Norge	   1.898	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   1.887	  
Holberg	  Norge	   1.675**	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   2.039	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   2.169	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   1.969	  
Odin	  Norge	   1.758	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   1.730	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   2.333	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   2.133	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   2.181	  
*	  Lower	  than	  dl	  
**	  dl	  <	  d	  <	  du 
	  
Table	  9	  Results	  of	  Durbin-­‐Watson	  test 
To determine whether autocorrelation exists in my data sets or not I use the critical values 
matching the significance level of 0,05. The lower boundary is 𝑑! = 1,65 and the upper 
boundary is 𝑑! = 1,69 (Mendenhall & Sincich, 2012). The decision rule for this test is to 
reject the null hypothesis (H0: No residual correlation) if the test statistics 𝑑 is lower than 
1,65. If 𝑑 is greater than 1,69 we fail to reject the null hypothesis, and a 𝑑-value between 1,65 
and 1,69 is in the uncertainty region where we need more information to draw a correct 
conclusion.  
 
From table 9 we see that most of the funds have a 𝑑-value greater than 1,69, and I fail to 
reject the null hypothesis for these funds. This means that I have no evidence to state that 
there exists positive autocorrelation between the residuals for these funds.  
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The only two funds with a 𝑑-value smaller than 1,69 are Alfred Berg Gambak and Atlas 
Norge. These funds 𝑑 -values are located in the rejection region and I reject the null 
hypothesis and keep the alternative hypothesis. This means, according to this test statistic, that 
there exists positive autocorrelation between these two funds residuals. Holberg Norge is the 
only fund with a 𝑑-value located in the inconclusive region. For this fund I do not have 
enough information to conclude whether positive autocorrelation between the residuals exist 
or not. The consequences that the residuals of Alfred Berg Gambak and Atlas Norge are 
autocorrelated are much the same for when the residuals are heteroscedastic. The OLS 
estimators are still unbiased and linear, but they are no longer the most efficient estimators 
meaning they do not have minimum variance compared to those with no autocorrelation 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2012).  
 
5.13.3 Testing for Normality 
Underlying the model that I regress, there are assumptions about the distribution of the 
residuals. When using a regression method following the method of OLS, the residuals have 
to be normally distributed and this can be tested both graphically and statistically. When 
statistically testing for normality, there are multiple appropriate tests to use. I have chosen to 
use the values of the skewness and excess kurtosis to determine whether the residuals follow a 
normal distribution or not. The values of skewness and excess kurtosis are presented in table 
10. A perfectly normal distributed data set has zero skewness and zero excess kurtosis. 
However, some level of skewness and excess kurtosis is acceptable, and the results have to be 
compared to graphical normal probability plots to be able to draw a conclusion. The skewness 
and excess kurtosis gives us an idea of the distribution of the residuals, but I have also looked 
at graphical probability plots for each fund. The probability plot for Alfred Berg Gambak is 
presented in Appendix 3. In general skewness greater than 0,5 gives indications that the 
distribution is asymmetrical and may not be normally distributed. When excess kurtosis 
exceeds zero, the distribution of the residuals have a higher and sharper peak than the normal 
distribution.  
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   Skewness	   Excess	  Kurtosis	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.00	   0.00	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.26*	   0.95*	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.00	   0.00	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.00	   0.00	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.00	   0.00	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.00	   0.00	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.01	   0.00	  
DNB	  Norge	   0.00	   0.00	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.77*	   0.00	  
Holberg	  Norge	   0.24*	   0.32*	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.00	   0.00	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   0.00	   0.00	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   0.00	   0.00	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.12*	   0.94*	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.52*	   0.15*	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.00	   0.00	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.05	   0.00	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   0.00	   0.00	  
*Indications	  of	  non-­‐normality	   	   	  
Table	  10	  Skewness	  and	  excess	  kurtosis 
From table 10 we see that five of the funds have values of skewness and excess kurtosis 
indicating a non-normal distribution. For the rest of the funds, skewness and excess kurtosis 
indicate a normal distribution. Even if the residuals are non-normally distributed, the 
regression is robust (Mendenhall & Sincich, 2012). The inferences derived from the 
regression analysis tend to be valid even though there is evidence of non-normality, and the 
assumption of normality is not completely satisfied. This depends on the level of non-
normality, and a strictly non-normal distribution of the residuals may lead to invalid 
inferences. None of my funds shows signs to be highly skewed or have a high excess kurtosis, 
so in this case a slight deviation from a normal distribution will still make the OLS estimators 
good estimators because the time series contains many observations.  
 
5.14 Performance in Bull and Bear Markets  
In chapter 3.2 I defined and described the main periods of bull and bear markets between 
1997 and 2013. The purpose behind this was to analyse whether there exists a relationship 
between the fund managers relative performance to the different stock market conditions. 
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To evaluate this I make a hypothesis to either be confirmed or rejected by my results. Do 
active managers on average outperform the benchmark by more in bullish markets than they 
do in bearish markets? I want to check if my results can give any indication that it is easier for 
the managers to generate higher excess returns when the stock market is in an upswing than 
when the market is falling. The reason behind this is that I believe it is easier for a portfolio 
manager to add on risk in bull markets, than to reduce portfolio risk in a bear market.  
 
Table 11 presents each funds annual excess return relative to OSEFX. I have also created an 
equally-weighted portfolio consisting of all the funds existing in the period with equal 
weights. The excess return of this portfolio is calculated as the arithmetic mean of all the 
funds excess returns. The annualized returns in each period for each fund is presented in 
Appendix 5, and a ranking of each period is presented in Appendix 6.  
 
	   Bear	   market	   2000-­‐
2003	  
Bull	   market	   2003-­‐
2007	  
Bear	   market	   2007-­‐
2009	  
Bull	   market	   2009-­‐
2013	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   4.8%	   6.7%	   5.5%	   0.1%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
0.7%	   1.1%	   3.8%	   0.5%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   -­‐5.3%	   15.0%	   3.9%	   -­‐0.9%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   3.0%	   2.1%	   3.2%	   -­‐1.2%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   2.2%	   -­‐3.4%	   5.0%	   2.3%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   3.5%	   -­‐0.1%	   5.7%	   3.3%	  
Delphi	  Norge	   4.9%	   7.1%	   4.3%	   2.1%	  
DNB	  Norge	   -­‐2.3%	   -­‐2.3%	   3.8%	   -­‐1.9%	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   -­‐4.0%	   -­‐1.6%	   5.1%	   -­‐0.1%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   -­‐	   13.4%	   2.2%	   -­‐5.5%	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.9%	   2.6%	   3.8%	   -­‐0.1%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐2.4%	   -­‐2.5%	   0.4%	   -­‐0.1%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐3.9%	   -­‐2.8%	   -­‐4.8%	   -­‐0.2%	  
Odin	  Norge	   4.7%	   11.5%	   -­‐1.4%	   -­‐10.9%	  
Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
3.3%	   -­‐6.4%	   2.8%	   1.6%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   3.2%	   -­‐8.2%	   5.0%	   -­‐0.7%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐2.5%	   0.5%	   2.0%	   0.5%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  
Norge	  
-­‐	   -­‐2.9%	   0.3%	   -­‐2.1%	  
Equally-­‐weighted	  
portfolio	  
0.7%	   1.7%	   2.8%	   -­‐0.7%	  
Table	  11	  Annual	  excess	  return	  in	  bull	  and	  bear	  markets 
For the first bear market period in the Norwegian stock market (January 2000 – December 
2002), 10 of the 16 funds generated annual excess return. We also see that an equally weighed 
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portfolio consisting of 16 funds would have outperformed OSEFX with an annual excess 
return of 0,7%.  
 
In the second period, the bull market from January 2003 to December 2006, nine of the 18 
funds were able to generate annual excess return. The best fund with respect to excess return 
this period was Atlas Norge, which outperformed OSEFX by 15%. An equally-weighted 
portfolio would have outperformed OSEFX by 1,7%.  
 
In the second bear market period, from January 2007 to December 2008, 16 of the 18 funds 
were able to generate annual excess return. This period does not support my hypothesis that 
actively managed funds generate higher excess return in bullish markets, since the equally-
weighted portfolio outperforms OSEFX by 2,8% in a time where the Norwegian stock market 
was falling. In addition, this period does not imply that it is easier for the active managers to 
generate excess return in bullish markets. This bearish market period is the period where most 
of the funds were able to outperform OSEFX.  
 
In the last bull market period, from January 2009 to December 2013, 7 of the 18 funds 
generated annual excess return. This result does not support my hypothesis either. The 
equally-weighted portfolio underperformed OSEFX. A reason for this may be that the 
financial crisis, that affected markets globally, made the portfolio managers nervous 
somehow, and they maybe searched for low risk stocks for their funds. Norwegian mutual 
funds have the freedom to invest 20% of the fund outside Norwegian listed stocks, and this 
gives the fund the opportunity to either take on big bets, or invest in safe, low-beta stocks to 
reduce the risk. OSEFX does not have this opportunity, and from Appendix 5 we see that all 
funds seen as one, the annual returns stabilized just below the annual return OSEFX 
generated.  
 
If I assemble the periods of bull market and the periods of bear market, 75,7% of my funds 
generated annual excess returns in the periods of bear market. In the bull markets upswings in 
the Norwegian stock market, only 44% of the funds generated annual excess return. This is 
not in accordance with my hypothesis that active managed funds outperform the benchmark 
more in bullish markets.  
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From table 11 we see that there are only three funds that managed to generate annual excess 
return relative to OSEFX for all four periods; Alfred Berg Gambak, Alfred Berg Norge 
Classic and Delphi Norge. The rest of the funds have at least one period with negative annual 
excess return. The only fund generating negative excess return for all periods is Nordea 
Vekst. We see from Appendix 4 as well, that Nordea Vekst is the fund with the lowest mean 
annual excess return for the whole period.  
 
The results from table 11 depend only on the funds return, and do not take either systematic or 
unsystematic risk into account. To be able to say something about the funds risk and return 
profiles during the periods of bull and bear, I have performed regression analyses computing 
alpha and beta values. The alpha values, representing the unsystematic risk, will show 
whether the funds generated risk-adjusted excess return relative to OSEFX in a certain period, 
and if the alpha´s are statistically significant or not. The beta values, representing the 
systematic risk, show the funds volatility relative to the volatility of OSEFX. For all periods 
of bull and bear OSEFX has alpha values of 0 and beta values of 1.  
 
	   Bear	  market	  2000-­‐2003	   Bull	  market	  2003-­‐2007	  
	   Alpha	  (p-­‐value)	   	   Beta	   R2	   Alpha	  (p-­‐value)	   	   Beta	   R2	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.005	  (0.62)	   	   1.19	   0.69	   0.002	  (0.78)	   	   1.05	   0.73	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.001	  (0.71)	   	   0.97	   0.97	   0.000	  (0.94)	   	   1.02	   0.97	  
Atlas	  Norge	   -­‐0.005	  (0.53)	   	   1.04	   0.69	   0.004	  (0.43)	   	   1.15	   0.82	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   -­‐0.003	  (0.68)	   	   0.85	   0.69	   -­‐0.002	  (0.53)	   	   1.04	   0.94	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.001	  (0.59)	   	   0.93	   0.97	   -­‐0.002	  (0.20)	   	   0.99	   0.98	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.002	  (0.25)	   	   0.92	   0.97	   -­‐0.001	  (0.38)	   	   0.99	   0.98	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.007	  (0.36)	   	   1.38	   0.83	   0.002	  (0.60)	   	   1.05	   0.83	  
Dnb	  Norge	   -­‐0.002	  (0.18)	   	   0.99	   0.98	   -­‐0.002	  (0.12)	   	   1.03	   0.98	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   -­‐0.002	  (0.63)	   	   0.97	   0.93	   -­‐0.003	  (0.12)	   	   1.06	   0.97	  
Holberg	  Norge	   	   	   	   	   0.008	  (0.05)*	   	   0.98	   0.84	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   0.000	  (0.88)	   	   0.96	   0.96	   0.001	  (0.76)	   	   1.03	   0.97	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.003	  (0.33)	   	   1.02	   0.94	   -­‐0.001	  (0.17)	   	   0.99	   0.99	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.004	  (0.25)	   	   1.02	   0.91	   -­‐0.002	  (0.29)	   	   1.01	   0.96	  
Odin	  Norge	   0.004	  (0.50)	   	   1.04	   0.83	   0.008	  (0.06)**	   	   0.95	   0.82	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.003	  (0.36)	   	   1.04	   0.94	   -­‐0.006	  (0.03)*	   	   1.08	   0.92	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.003	  (0.36)	   	   1.01	   0.95	   -­‐0.005	  (0.00)*	   	   1.00	   0.97	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐0.002	  (0.29)	   	   1.05	   0.98	   0.000	  (0.73)	   	   1.03	   0.98	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002	  (0.55)	   	   1.00	   0.89	  
*	  Significant	  at	  a	  5%	  significance	  level	  
**	  Significant	  at	  a	  10%	  significance	  level	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Table	  12	  Regression	  results	  for	  2000-­‐2003	  and	  2003-­‐2007 
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From the regression analyses shown in table 12, we see that none of the funds in the first 
period of bear market had statistically significant alpha values. This means that I have no 
evidence to say that any of the funds generated statistically significant risk-adjusted excess 
return in the period 2000-2003. Most of the beta values in the same period are close to 1, but 
one of the funds deviates more than the other funds. Delphi Norge has a beta of 1,38, meaning 
this fund had more systematic risk than OSEFX in the period and hence more volatile than its 
benchmark index. This should lead to higher returns, and we see, although it is not 
statistically significant, that the alpha value of the fund is the highest for the period. In the 
first period of bear market, Holberg Norge and Storebrand Optima Norge are excluded. This 
is because these funds were not established until 2001, and hence the returns for these funds 
do not go back to 2000.  
 
For the second period, the bull period from 2003-2007, three of the funds (Holberg Norge, 
Omega Investment Fund A and Pluss Aksje) have statistically significant alphas with a 
significance level of 5%. For Holberg Norge this means I have evidence to say that the fund 
outperformed OSEFX with respect to the risk-adjusted excess return by 0,8%. For Omega 
Investment Fund A and Pluss Aksje, their significant alpha is negative, and I can conclude 
that these two funds underperformed OSEFX with respect to risk-adjusted excess return. Odin 
Norge has a statistically significant alpha when the significance level is at 10%.  
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   Bear	  market	  2007-­‐2009	   Bull	  market	  2009-­‐2013	  
	   Alpha	  (p-­‐value)	   	   Beta	   R2	   Alpha	  (p-­‐value)	   	   Beta	   R2	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.002	  (0.73)	   	   0.96	   0.94	   0.002	  (0.45)	   	   0.88	   0.90	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   0.002	  (0.30)	   	   0.96	   0.99	   0.001	  (0.44)	   	   0.96	   0.98	  
Atlas	  Norge	   0.002	  (0.53)	   	   0.92	   0.98	   -­‐0.001	  (0.29)	   	   1.03	   0.97	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   0.002	  (0.38)	   	   0.95	   0.99	   0.001	  (0.79)	   	   1.01	   0.93	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   0.003	  (0.37)	   	   0.87	   0.96	   0.000	  (0.80)	   	   0.99	   0.97	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   0.004	  (0.37)	   	   0.86	   0.96	   0.001	  (0.44)	   	   0.99	   0.97	  
Delphi	  Norge	   0.000	  (0.97)	   	   0.85	   0.96	   0.002	  (0.40)	   	   0.95	   0.91	  
Dnb	  Norge	   0.002	  (0.31)	   	   0.91	   0.99	   0.001	  (0.73)	   	   0.91	   0.96	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   0.004	  (0.11)	   	   1.02	   0.99	   0.000	  (0.83)	   	   1.00	   0.93	  
Holberg	  Norge	  	   -­‐0.003	  (0.47)	   	   0.69	   0.92	   -­‐0.005	  (0.05)*	   	   0.94	   0.91	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   -­‐0.001	  (0.86)	   	   0.86	   0.92	   -­‐0.001	  (0.66)	   	   1.02	   0.97	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.001	  (0.52)	   	   0.94	   0.99	   0.000	  (0.68)	   	   0.99	   0.99	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.006	  (0.06)**	   	   0.90	   0.97	   0.000	  (0.79)	   	   0.99	   0.98	  
Odin	  Norge	   -­‐0.008	  (0.19)	   	   0.67	   0.87	   -­‐0.005	  (0.12)	   	   0.85	   0.82	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   0.002	  (0.56)	   	   0.95	   0.97	   0.001	  (0.73)	   	   1.02	   0.94	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   0.003	  (0.33)	   	   0.81	   0.97	   0.001	  (0.29)	   	   0.92	   0.98	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   0.001	  (0.77)	   	   0.95	   0.99	   0.000	  (0.53)	   	   0.99	   0.99	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   -­‐0.001	  (0.80)	   	   0.92	   0.96	   0.000	  (0.92)	   	   0.93	   0.90	  
*	  Significant	  at	  a	  5%	  significance	  level	  
**	  Significant	  at	  a	  10%	  significance	  level	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Table	  13	  Regression	  results	  for	  2007-­‐2009	  and	  2009-­‐2013 
When looking at the results from the regression analysis for the bear market period from 
2007-2009 in table 13, none of the funds have a statistically significant alpha when using a 
significance level of 5%. However, with a significance level of 10%, Nordea Vekst has a 
negative significant alpha. This means Nordea Vekst underperformed OSEFX with respect to 
risk-adjusted excess return by 0,6%. The beta values in this period is a bit more spread than 
the first two periods, but we see that the fund with the lowest beta (the lowest systematic 
risk), Odin Norge, also produced the lowest alpha (lowest risk-adjusted excess return). On the 
other hand, the fund with the highest beta, Handelsbanken Norge, produced the highest alpha. 
This is in accordance with the portfolio theory described in chapter 4.  
 
In the last period of bull market, from 2009-2013, only one of the funds produced a 
statistically significant alpha. Holberg Norge had an alpha of -0,005 meaning I have evidence 
to say that the fund underperformed OSEFX by 0,5% with respect to risk-adjusted excess 
return. The rest of the funds did not generate significant alphas.  
 
The low number of funds with significant alpha values shows that I am not able to discover 
patterns with respect to risk-adjusted excess return for the periods of bull and bear market. 
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However, I am able to say something about the funds systematic risk relative to the 
benchmark.  
	   Average	  beta	  
1997-­‐2013	   0.98	  
Bear	  market	  2000-­‐2003	   1.02	  
Bull	  market	  2003-­‐2007	   1.03	  
Bear	  market	  2007-­‐2009	   0.89	  
Bull	  market	  2009-­‐2013	   0.96	  
Table	  14	  Average	  beta 
Table 14 shows the average beta for all of the funds, both for the whole period and for the 
periods of bull and bear market. For the first two periods of bear market and bull market, we 
see that the funds on average had a little higher systematic risk than OSEFX. In the two last 
periods, the funds volatility was lower than the volatility of OSEFX. However, the average 
beta for the funds in the period 2007-2009 was relatively low and shows that during the 
financial crisis the funds did not take on extreme bets with high risk.  
 
5.15 Total Ranking  
In this chapter I will use the results from the previous chapters to discuss the total ranking of 
the funds, based on the performance measures and total shareholder return. In table 15 I have 
ranked the funds based on the three performance measures from chapter 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
The Sharpe ratio and the M2 measure gives the same ranking, but combined with the 
information ratio the rankings differs a little. To do this total ranking based on the 
performance measures, I added up the three rankings for each fund and divided it by three.  
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   Total	  Ranking	  
Delphi	  Norge	   1	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   2	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   3	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   4	  
Holberg	  Norge	   5	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   6	  
Atlas	  Norge	   7	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   8	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   9	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   10	  
Odin	  Norge	   11	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   12	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   13	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   14	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   15	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   16	  
Dnb	  Norge	   17	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   18	  
Table	  15	  Total	  Ranking	  
This ranking shows that a rational investor in 1997 should have invested in Delphi Norge, 
KLP Aksje Norge, Carnegie Aksje Norge or one of the other highly ranked funds assumed a 
perfect foresight. The funds with the lower rankings would, according to the three 
performance measures, not yield as good risk-adjusted return as the highest ranked funds in 
the 17-year period.  
 
To be sure that these performance measures give a correct picture of the reality, I simulate 
investments in each fund. The investment was 1000 NOK in each fund in 1997, and for the 
funds not established in 1997, I invested 1000 NOK from their launch date. This simulation 
results in which funds you would have got the highest capital gain, and is purely return based. 
The calculations of the investments are based on the total shareholder return (TSR), discussed 
in chapter 4.3.5. The value of the 1000 NOK investment in Alfred Berg Gambak in 1997 
would in 2013 been worth:  
 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!"!!"#$ = 1000 ∗ 1+ 𝑇𝑆𝑅!"!!"#$  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒!"!!"#$ = 1000 ∗ 1+ 386,26% =   4863  𝑁𝑂𝐾 
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In table 16 the simulated investments are presented and ranked from highest capital gain to 
the lowest. I simulated an investment in OSEFX as well to compare the funds to the 
benchmark. The risk-free rate of return calculated in chapter 5.5 is also included, representing 
a risk-free deposit in the bank of 1000 NOK in 1997.  
 
	   December	  2013	  
Delphi	  Norge	   5642	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   5290	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   4863	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   4301	  
Klp	  Aksje	  Norge	  (1999-­‐2013)	   4126	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   4010	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   3868	  
OSEFX	   3719	  
Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   3678	  
Odin	  Norge	   3501	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   3500	  
Atlas	  Norge	  (1998-­‐2013)	   3479	  
Holberg	  Norge	  (2001-­‐2013)	   3297	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   3252	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   3121	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   3114	  
Dnb	  Norge	   3013	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   2983	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   2478	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	  (2001-­‐2013)	   2371	  
Risk-­‐Free	  Investment	   2002	  
Table	  16	  Value	  Growth	  1997-­‐2013 
From table 16 we see that there are quite large differences between the funds. While an 
investment in Delphi Norge would give a final value of 5642 NOK in 2013, the investment in 
Nordea Vekst would only have grown to 2478 NOK. In other words, if you invested in 
Nordea Vekst in 1997 rather than Delphi Norge, you would in 2013 had 56% less capital gain. 
Storebrand Optima Norge is the lowest ranked fund, but it was launched in 2001, and 
comparing it to funds started in 1997 is unfair. The highest ranked funds in table 15 are also 
the funds with the largest actual capital gains. This shows that high risk-adjusted performance 
coincides with high total return.  
 
Figure 4 shows the value growth of the fund with the highest capital gain (Delphi Norge), the 
fund with the lowest capital gain (Storebrand Optima Norge), OSEFX and the risk-free 
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investment. In addition, an equally-weighted portfolio (FUNDS) of all the funds are included 
in the figure, showing the average return of all funds.  
 
	  
Figure	  4	  Total	  Returns 
If you invested 1000 NOK in OSEFX in 1997, the value in 2013 would be 3719 NOK. 
Compared to the funds, this investment is among the best half. In comparison, a strictly risk 
averse investor with a 1000 NOK deposit in the bank in 1997 would have 2002 NOK in his 
account in 2013. This is 65% less than if he invested in Delphi Norge.   
 
When evaluating the performance of the funds in different states of the stock market, I based 
the evaluation on return and excess return. To see which funds managed to deliver the highest 
capital gain (or lowest capital loss) I have done the same simulation as I did for the whole 
period, in the periods of bear market and bull market. The results for the three best funds, the 
three worst funds (below the red line) and OSEFX are presented in table 17 and 18. The 
simulated investment starts at the beginning of the period and the final value is the value at 
the end of the period. I simulated an investment for the first period of 1000 NOK in January 
2000 and calculated the final value at the end of the bear market period in December 2002. 
The same follows for the other periods.  
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2000-­‐2003	   Bear	  market	   2003-­‐2007	   Bull	  market	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   671	   Holberg	  Norge	   5457	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   664	   Odin	  Norge	   5229	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   642	   Delphi	  Norge	   4639	  
OSEFX	   596	   Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   4162	  
Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   584	   OSEFX	   4142	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   526	   Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   3763	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   508	   Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   3515	  
Atlas	  Norge	   417	   Pluss	  Aksje	   3283	  
Table	  17	  Value	  growth	  2000-­‐2003	  and	  2003-­‐2007 
In the first period of bear market we see from table 17 that all of the funds had a capital loss. 
But there are still differences between the funds. If you invested in Atlas Norge in 2000 rather 
than Danske Invest Norge 2, the capital loss would be 583 NOK rather than 329 NOK. As we 
see from Appendix 5, Atlas Norge has a higher standard deviation than Danske Invest Norge 
2, and this risk may be some of the reason for the funds capital loss. For this period, Atlas 
Norge also has a higher beta value, indicating higher systematic risk. In general, higher risk 
should be rewarded by higher return, hence higher risk may lead to greater losses.  
 
In the period of bear market from 2003 to 2007, an investment of 1000 NOK in January 2003 
would yield a relatively high capital gain even when investing in the lowest ranked fund, 
Pluss Aksje. If you invested 1000 NOK in the highest ranked fund in this period, Holberg 
Norge, you would during only 4 years have increased the value by impressing 445%. Holberg 
Norge´s standard deviation in this period was not especially high during this period either (see 
Appendix 5), and the total ranking of the fund in table 15 shows that the fund is ranked 
number 5 for the whole period. Holberg Norge´s beta for the period is 0,98 indicating that this 
fund was able to generate high return without bearing a high risk in this period.  
 
2007-­‐2013	   Bear	  market	   2009-­‐2013	   Bull	  market	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   568	   Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   2865	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   562	   Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   2760	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   550	   Delphi	  Norge	   2701	  
Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   502	   OSEFX	   2561	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   469	   Equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	   2461	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   465	   Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   2304	  
OSEFX	   448	   Holberg	  Norge	  	   1906	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   427	   Odin	  Norge	   1659	  
Table	  18	  Value	  growth	  2007-­‐2009	  and	  2009-­‐2013 
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The simulated investment of 1000 NOK in 2007 would as expected not yield any capital gain, 
but the funds managed to get through this period relatively well compared to the index. 
OSEFX had the second highest capital loss this period, and only Nordea Vekst was 
outperformed by the benchmark with respect to total return. The rest of the funds had lower 
capital loss than OSEFX, and this implies that the portfolio managers in these funds were 
clever in their stock picking and portfolio management in a bearish stock market.  
 
In the last period, the bull market from 2009-2013, the funds did not perform as well 
compared to OSEFX as they did in the period 2007-2009. They did generate return and the 
simulated investment had significant capital gains, but in the bull market from 2003-2007, the 
capital gains were much higher and the bull market stronger.   
 
Danske Invest 1 and Danske Invest 2 are among the top three funds in three of the periods. 
This shows that these two funds have either had great luck in their investments, or they are 
skilled when it comes to picking the optimal investments in different cycles in the stock 
market. Table 17 and 18 also show that an equally-weighted portfolio of all the funds beat 
OSEFX in the first period of bull market and the last period of bear market. The portfolio 
underperforms OSEFX in the first period of bear market and the last period of bull market. 
However, it is important to keep in mind the risk of survivorship bias when looking at the 
equally-weighted portfolio. It only includes funds that existed the whole bear/bull period, and 
funds closing during the periods are excluded. This may lead to survivorship bias and based 
on this portfolio I cannot draw conclusions for the whole fund universe, only for the funds 
included in this study.  
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have done an analysis of 18 different Norwegian mutual equity funds in the 
period 1997-2013. During this period the equity market in Norway, represented by the Oslo 
Stock Exchange Benchmark Index have increased by 243%. In the same period, the best 
performing fund, with respect to total shareholder return, have increased its value by 464%, 
while the worst performing fund increased only by 137%.  
 
An equity fund is always expected to beat risk-free interest rate through a business cycle, but 
the goal of active portfolio management is also to beat the market, or more precisely the 
benchmark index they compare themselves against. This has been the main research topic 
throughout the thesis; to see whether the portfolio managers of the active managed funds 
actually have been able to generate excess return relative to their benchmark. I have analysed 
this both for the whole period of 1997-2013, but also through four distinct periods 
representing bullish and bearish periods in the stock market. Did the portfolio managers 
perform better in bull markets than in bear markets?  
 
To be able to conclude on these questions, I applied different performance measures; both 
risk-adjusted and absolute return-based measures. These measures are made to make it easier 
to compare funds, evaluate fund managers and they are helpful tools to the investors when 
seeking an active manager which hopefully provide excess return for his fund in the future.  
 
Another way to evaluate a funds performance is to apply series of historical data into a 
regression analysis. This analysis shows the relationship between the fund and its benchmark. 
The regression produces alpha-values, an important term in this field of study. These values 
tell you whether the fund managed to generate risk-adjusted excess return relative to the 
benchmark – the main goal for the active portfolio managers. Other studies (Sørensen, 2009) 
tends to conclude that the alpha values are not significant, meaning no significant under- or 
outperformance by the funds. None of the alphas during the 17-year period for my funds were 
significant either. This does not mean the funds did not generate excess return, but the excess 
returns they generated adjusted for risk were not statistically significant.  
 
The other output from the regression analysis is the funds beta values and R2. The beta values 
represent the funds risk relative to the benchmark. The funds beta values, both for the whole 
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period and for the periods of bull and bear market, were close to one. However, I observed 
beta values indicating that the funds had either higher or lower systematic risk than their 
benchmark index. All of the funds R2 were high and this shows that the movements in the 
benchmark index are highly correlated with the movements in the funds.  
 
The performance measures I used other than the output from the regression analysis was the 
Sharpe ratio, the M2 measure and the information ratio. These measures reflect which 
investment decision would have been the optimal for a rational investor. Based on these 
measures I ranked the funds and found out which funds would be the best investment for a 
rational investor. The top ranked funds were usually found at the highest rankings in all of the 
performance measures. Not surprisingly, they also topped the rankings when measuring total 
shareholder return.  
 
When evaluating the different periods, the results were more differentiated. It does not seem 
to be a clear pattern with respect to the funds excess return in different stock market states, 
but a larger number of the funds managed to outperform the benchmark during bear markets 
than in the periods of bull market with respect to excess return. The regression analyses 
conducted for the periods of bull and bear market gave much the same results as for the whole 
period, but some of the funds had significant alphas during the periods. However, the few 
significant alphas generated were both positive and negative and I was not able to discover a 
distinct trend based on this. The beta values of the funds during the different periods were 
more spread than when analysing the whole period. This shows that the fund manager either 
choose to adjust their portfolio by taking on higher risk due to a growing stock market, or 
reducing the risk to minimize losses in a declining stock market.  
 
To evaluate the funds against their benchmark, I created an equally weighted portfolio 
consisting on equal shares of every fund. This portfolio is supposed to represent all of the 
funds seen as one, and check if this portfolio would manage to beat the benchmark. For the 
whole period, the portfolio did not manage to beat the benchmark with respect to total 
shareholder return. An investment in an index fund in this period would yield a higher capital 
gain than investing in the equally-weighted portfolio. However, the equally weighted 
portfolio has a lower beta than the benchmark index, and the expected return will therefore be 
lower as well. When looking at this portfolio for the shorter periods, the portfolio would beat 
the benchmark in the first three periods with respect to total shareholder return.  
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To sum up, the active managed funds I have investigated through different stock market 
cycles both did and did not beat their benchmark. In my sample of funds, the distribution of 
funds outperforming versus the ones underperforming the benchmark is close to 50-50. And 
on average, over the whole period, and as a group they actually underperformed versus their 
benchmark. While the alpha values were not significant, we still see that the capital gains 
from investing in the highest ranked funds were much higher than the capital gain of the 
benchmark. The performance measures also indicate outperformance of the benchmark of 
some funds and underperformance by others. However, all these measures are based on 
historical data, and they are not necessarily reliable indicators for future performance. Picking 
an active manager seems to be difficult despite statistical methods and advanced quantitative 
measurements. Perhaps there is a need for an even deeper analysis of the strategy and 
investment philosophy behind each active managed fund before making a qualified decision. 
If this looks to complex, time consuming and risky, you should probably just go for the index.  
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Appendix 
1 Presentation of the Funds 	  	  
Fund	   Ticker	   Launch	  
date	  
Benchmark	  
index	  
	  	  	  	  	  Minimum	  investment	   Management	  
fee	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   GA-­‐GAMB	   01/11/90	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  25	  000	  	   1.80%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   AI-­‐NORG	   31/12/94	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  25	  000	  	   1.20%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   NR-­‐
NORGE	  
24/02/98	   OSEFX	   Kr	  50	  000	   0.75%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   CA-­‐AKSJE	   07/07/95	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  1	  000	  	   1.20%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   FF-­‐NORGE	   03/01/94	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  1	  000	  	   2.00%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   FF-­‐NORII	   02/01/94	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  50	  000	  	   1.25%	  
Delphi	  Norge	   DF-­‐
NORGE	  
03/06/94	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  300	  	   2.00%	  
DNB	  Norge	   DK-­‐
PBNOR	  
27/07/95	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  100	  	   1.80%	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   HF-­‐
NORGE	  
06/03/95	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  1	  000	  	   2.00%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   HO-­‐
NORGE	  
28/12/00	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  1	  000	  	   1.50%	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   KL-­‐AKSNO	   18/09/98	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  3	  000	  	   0.75%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   KF-­‐AVKAS	   01/02/81	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  100	  	   1.50%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   KF-­‐VEKST	   02/01/81	  
	  
OSEFX	   	  kr	  100	  	   2.00%	  
Odin	  Norge	  	   OD-­‐
NORGE	  
26/06/92	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  3	  000	  	   2.00%	  
Pareto	  Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  
A	  
OR-­‐INVF	   03/01/85	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  2	  000	  	   1.80%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   FO-­‐AKSJE	   27/12/96	   OSEFX	   kr	  50	  000	   1.20%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   SP-­‐NORGE	   16/08/83	   OSEFX	   	  kr	  100	  	   1.50%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   SP-­‐OPTIM	   28/12/00	   OSEBX	   	  kr	  100	  000	  	   1.00%	  
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66	  
2 Regression Analysis From STATA of Alfred Berg Gambak (1997-2013) 
 
Regression analysis: GA-GAMB (regressand) versus OSEFX (regressor) 
Regression equation:  𝐺𝐴𝐺𝐴𝑀𝐵 = 0.0025886+ 0.9940892×𝑂𝑆𝐸𝐹𝑋 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistics = 1.473633 
Mean residuals = 4.11e-12  	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       _cons     .0025886   .0026255     0.99   0.325    -.0025889    .0077661
       OSEFX     .9940892   .0377734    26.32   0.000     .9195993    1.068579
                                                                              
      GAGAMB        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.20940565   199  .006077415           Root MSE      =  .03685
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7766
    Residual    .268879574   198  .001357978           R-squared     =  0.7777
       Model    .940526071     1  .940526071           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   198) =  692.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     200
. regress GAGAMB OSEFX
 67	  
4.1 Result From Testing for Autocorrelation of Alfred Berg Gambak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Result From Testing for Normality for Alfred Berg Gambak 
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4 Annualized Mean Returns, Annualized Mean Excess Returns and Annualized 
Mean Standard Deviations for the Period 1997-2013 	  
	   𝒓𝒑	   (𝒓𝒑 − 𝒓𝑴)	   𝝈𝒑	  
Risk-­‐free	   4.21%	   	   	  
OSEFX	   11.47%	   	   21.16%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   14.97%	   3.50%	   23.92%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  Classic	   11.37%	   -­‐0.10%	   20.72%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   14.18%	   2.71%	   25.84%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   14.03%	   2.56%	   21.37%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  1	   11.58%	   0.12%	   21.07%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  2	   12.48%	   1.01%	   21.08%	  
Delphi	  Norge	   15.60%	   4.13%	   24.46%	  
DNB	  Norge	   9.73%	   -­‐1.73%	   20.59%	  
Handelsbanken	  Norge	   9.96%	   -­‐1.51%	   21.34%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   12.95%	   1.49%	   20.19%	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   14.34%	   2.88%	   20.48%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   9.87%	   -­‐1.59%	   20.66%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   8.41%	   -­‐3.06%	   21.02%	  
Odin	  Norge	   11.19%	   -­‐0.28%	   20.83%	  
Omega	  Investment	  Fund	  A	   10.36%	   -­‐1.10%	   21.89%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   12.36%	   0.90%	   20.93%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   10.90%	   -­‐0.57%	   21.18%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  Norge	   10.18%	   -­‐1.28%	   21.70%	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5 Annualized Returns and Standard Deviations in Periods of Bull Market and 
Bear Market 	  
	   Bear	  market	  2000-­‐
2003	  
Bull	  market	  2003-­‐
2007	  
Bear	  market	  2007-­‐
2009	  
Bull	  market	  2009-­‐
2013	  
	   𝒓𝒑	   𝝈𝒑	   𝒓𝒑	   𝝈𝒑	   𝒓𝒑	   𝝈𝒑	   𝒓𝒑	   𝝈𝒑	  
OSEFX	   -­‐13.3%	   22.7%	   43.7%	   18.7%	   -­‐20.6%	   29.6%	   25.8%	   18.5%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   -­‐8.5%	   32.7%	   50.4%	   22.8%	   -­‐15.1%	   28.6%	   25.9%	   16.5%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
-­‐13.7%	   23.1%	   44.9%	   19.6%	   -­‐16.7%	   28.2%	   26.3%	   17.7%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   -­‐20.5%	   28.5%	   51.6%	   23.4%	   -­‐16.6%	   28.2%	   25.6%	   19.1%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  Norge	   -­‐10.3%	   21.9%	   45.8%	   20.1%	   -­‐17.3%	   28.2%	   24.8%	   19.5%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  
1	  
-­‐11.1%	   21.0%	   40.3%	   18.7%	   -­‐15.5%	   26.3%	   28.4%	   18.7%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  
2	  
-­‐9.8%	   21.0%	   41.4%	   18.8%	   -­‐14.9%	   26.0%	   29.3%	   18.7%	  
Delphi	  Norge	   -­‐8.5%	   34.1%	   50.8%	   21.4%	   -­‐16.3%	   25.5%	   28.2%	   18.1%	  
DNB	  Norge	   -­‐15.6%	   23.0%	   2.9%	   19.6%	   -­‐2.1%	   27.5%	   24.2%	   17.4%	  
Handelsbanken	  
Norge	  
-­‐17.3%	   23.1%	   42.1%	   20.2%	   -­‐15.5%	   30.0%	   26.0%	   19.0%	  
Holberg	  Norge	   -­‐	   -­‐	   57.2%	   19.5%	   -­‐18.3%	   21.9%	   20.6%	   17.8%	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   -­‐12.5%	   22.0%	   46.3%	   20.1%	   -­‐16.8%	   25.3%	   25.9%	   18.9%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐15.7%	   23.9%	   41.2%	   18.8%	   -­‐20.2%	   27.4%	   26.0%	   18.8%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐17.2%	   24.3%	   40.9%	   19.5%	   -­‐25.3%	   27.3%	   25.9%	   18.8%	  
Odin	  Norge	   -­‐8.7%	   25.9%	   55.2%	   19.4%	   -­‐21.9%	   22.0%	   15.2%	   17.0%	  
Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
-­‐10.0%	   23.9%	   37.3%	   20.7%	   -­‐17.8%	   28.6%	   27.7%	   19.5%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   -­‐10.1%	   22.7%	   35.5%	   19.2%	   -­‐15.5%	   24.7%	   25.4%	   17.3%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐15.8%	   24.1%	   44.3%	   19.6%	   -­‐18.6%	   27.9%	   26.6%	   18.4%	  
Storebrand	  Optima	  
Norge	  
-­‐	   -­‐	   3.1%	   20.0%	   -­‐20.2%	   28.1%	   24.0%	   18.2%	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6 Excess Return Ranked for the Periods of Bull Market and Bear Market 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   Bear	  market	  
2000-­‐2002	  
	  	   Bull	  market	  
2003-­‐2006	  
	  	   Bear	  market	  
2007-­‐2009	  
	  	   Bull	  market	  
2009-­‐2013	  
Delphi	  Norge	   4.9%	   Atlas	  Norge	   15.0%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  2	  
5.7%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  2	  
3.3%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  
GAMBAK	  
4.8%	   Holberg	  Norge	   13.4%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   5.5%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  1	  
2.3%	  
Odin	  Norge	   4.7%	   Odin	  Norge	   11.5%	   Handelsbanken	  
Norge	  
5.1%	   Delphi	  Norge	   2.1%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  
2	  
3.5%	   Delphi	  Norge	   7.1%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  1	  
5.0%	   Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
1.6%	  
Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
3.3%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   6.7%	   Pluss	  Aksje	   5.0%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
0.5%	  
Pluss	  Aksje	   3.2%	   KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   2.6%	   Delphi	  Norge	   4.3%	   Storebrand	  Norge	   0.5%	  
Carnegie	  Aksje	  
Norge	  
3.0%	   Carnegie	  Aksje	  
Norge	  
2.1%	   Atlas	  Norge	   3.9%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Gambak	   0.1%	  
Danske	  Invest	  Norge	  
1	  
2.2%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
1.1%	   Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
3.8%	   Handelsbanken	  
Norge	  
-­‐0.1%	  
KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   0.9%	   Storebrand	  Norge	   0.5%	   DNB	  Norge	   3.8%	   Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐0.1%	  
Alfred	  Berg	  Norge	  
Classic	  
0.7%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  2	  
-­‐0.1%	   KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	   3.8%	   KLP	  Aksje	  Norge	  	   -­‐0.1%	  
DNB	  Norge	   -­‐2.3%	   Handelsbanken	  
Norge	  
-­‐1.6%	   Carnegie	  Aksje	  
Norge	  
3.2%	   Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐0.2%	  
Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐2.4%	   DNB	  Norge	   -­‐2.3%	   Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
2.8%	   Pluss	  Aksje	   -­‐0.7%	  
Storebrand	  Norge	   -­‐2.5%	   Nordea	  Avkastning	   -­‐2.5%	   Holberg	  Norge	   2.2%	   Atlas	  Norge	   -­‐0.9%	  
Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐3.9%	   Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐2.8%	   Storebrand	  Norge	   2.0%	   Carnegie	  Aksje	  
Norge	  
-­‐1.2%	  
Handelsbanken	  
Norge	  
-­‐4.0%	   Storebrand	  Optima	  
Norge	  	  
-­‐2.9%	   Nordea	  Avkastning	   0.4%	   DNB	  Norge	   -­‐1.9%	  
Atlas	  Norge	   -­‐5.3%	   Danske	  Invest	  
Norge	  1	  
-­‐3.4%	   Storebrand	  Optima	  
Norge	  	  
0.3%	   Storebrand	  Optima	  
Norge	  	  
-­‐2.1%	  
	  	   	  	   Omega	  Investment	  
Fund	  A	  
-­‐6.4%	   Odin	  Norge	   -­‐1.4%	   Holberg	  Norge	   -­‐5.5%	  
	  	   	  	   Pluss	  Aksje	   -­‐8.2%	   Nordea	  Vekst	   -­‐4.8%	   Odin	  Norge	   -­‐10.9%	  
